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Abstract
How successful are sanctions at targeting the economic interests of political elites
in affected countries? We study the efficacy of targeting in the case of Iran, using
information on the stock exchange-listed assets of two specific political entities with
substantial influence over the direction of Iran’s nuclear program. Our identification
strategy focuses on the process of negotiations for sanctions removal, examining which
interests benefit most from news about diplomatic progress. We find that the stock
returns of firms owned by targeted political elites respond especially sharply to such
news, though other listed firms unconnected to these elites also benefit from progress
towards sanctions relief. These results indicate the ‘bluntness’ of sanctions on Iran,
but also provide evidence of their effectiveness in generating economic incentives for
elite policymakers to negotiate a deal for sanctions relief.
JEL code: F51.
We thank Abel Brodeur and seminar participants at Paris School of Economics, LSE, King’s College
London, Sussex, Helsinki, Carleton, Ottawa, the NBER Economics of National Security Summer Institute,
the EBRD Economics of the Middle East Conference (especially our discussant Simon Commander), the
Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association, the Royal Economic Society Annual Confer-
ence, the Warwick University Peace Studies Association Conference, the LICOS Centre for Institutions and
Economic Performance 25 Years Workshop and the Free University of Bozen-Bolzano’s Applied Microeco-
nomics Workshop. We also thank Femi Amoo, Terry Cheng, Divya Deepthi and Neel Ocean for excellent
research assistance. This research was financially supported by KU Leuven (Long term structural funding -
Methusalem funding by the Flemish Government), the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) (under grant
G074718N), and Warwick’s Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) research centre.
∗Department of Economics, University of Warwick
†Department of Economics, University of Ottawa
‡Department of Economics, University of Warwick
§Faculty of Economics and Business, KU Leuven
1
1 Introduction
Economic sanctions are an important tool of foreign policy, providing an instrument by
which states may attempt to influence policies abroad without resorting to military force or
covert action. In recent years, sanctions have been at the forefront of international responses
to Russia’s foreign policy decisions regarding the Ukraine and to Iran’s program for the
development of nuclear technology. Other prominent recent examples of sanctions have
included measures leveled against Burma, Iraq, North Korea and Syria, among many others.
Once imposed, sanctions act as a ‘carrot’ for policymakers in the sanctioned country, as
the actors imposing sanctions offer to remove them in exchange for policy reform. But if
imposing sanctions is costly for the senders, then they will prefer to design this incentive
as efficiently as possible. In theory, sanctions should therefore be focused on the sources
of income most valued by those responsible for the key policy decisions, rather than the
economy of the receiving country as a whole. In line with this logic, a central principle
underlying the design of modern sanctions regimes is that they should be targeted as much
as possible to the economic interests of elite decisionmakers.1
In practice, however, it may be difficult to design sanctions that stay ‘on target’. This
might be because the targeted group is particularly well placed to avoid even carefully
designed sanctions, or is able to redistribute the effects of sanctions to less powerful groups
within the sanctioned country.2 Alternatively, the policy instruments used by the sender
could be too blunt to target any particular group within the sanctioned country. While states
are increasingly employing ‘smart sanctions’ instruments designed to affect only particular
firms or individuals, many sanctions regimes also incorporate more comprehensive trade and
financial restrictions, which may be difficult to selectively ‘switch on and off’ across different
agents in a receiving country.3
In this paper, we consider the case of Iran, which was subject to multilateral sanctions
related to its nuclear program until early 2016. Over several years of diplomatic negotiations
1For example, the European Commission (2008) asserts the principle that “[a]s a general rule, sanctions
should target as closely as possible the individuals and entities responsible for the undesirable policies and
actions, thus minimising adverse effects on others.” An alternative form of targeting focuses on particular
industries, as with arms embargoes (DellaVigna and La Ferrara 2010).
2For example, the UN’s Oil-for-Food program in Iraq was designed to maintain an oil embargo on Iraq
while still providing the country with access to humanitarian supplies, but there is strong evidence that the
policy was circumvented, presumably to the benefit of Iraq’s political elite (Hsieh and Moretti 2006).
3Such a problem of ‘bluntness’ leading to unintended consequences is not unique to sanctions policy
and may also be present in strategies involving armed intervention (Dell and Querubin 2018) or military
assistance (Dube and Naidu 2015).
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ending in July 2015, Iran and its sanctioners came to an agreement in which Iran consented
to changes in its nuclear policies in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. If these
sanctions were successfully targeted, their removal should have benefited the policymaking
elite, rewarding them for changing the policy for which sanctions were imposed.
Our paper exploits this insight about the returns to the lifting of sanctions in order to
test for the effectiveness of the targeting of domestic political elites in the Iranian case. We
consider two key actors who were targeted by the senders of sanctions because of their im-
portant roles in decisions about Iran’s nuclear program: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Both of these actors reportedly
control large conglomerates, and we check whether certain observable assets of those con-
glomerates – specifically, their holdings in firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE)
– were positively affected by diplomatic progress towards a multilateral sanctions deal. We
also compare the TSE returns of these ‘target firms’ to those of a set of unrelated firms with
no known connection to the targeted conglomerates, so as to better understand the relative
impact of sanctions relief across these two (TSE-listed) parts of the Iranian economy.
To accomplish this, we identify ‘information shocks’ regarding the progress of diplomatic
negotiations, and compare contemporaneous shifts in firm-level TSE returns across target
and unrelated firms. We first explore a compelling case study: the stock market reaction
to a breakthrough in multilateral negotiations in Geneva between Iran and the main sanc-
tioning countries in November 2013. This ‘big bang’ event is conveniently timed, with much
information about the progress of negotiations accruing over the TSE’s weekend break. Be-
cause of this, we are able to cleanly capture the TSE market response to the most important
turning point in the negotiations for sanctions removal.
We then use high-frequency text-based measures of news about sanctions negotiations
to capture information shocks covering the full period from the re-opening of serious nego-
tiations in 2012 to agreement on a final deal in 2015. This allows us to test the sensitivity
of different types of firms to news about possible progress towards the lifting of sanctions
using a large collection of events. The measures we use – derived from the Factiva and
GDELT (Global Database of Events, Language and Tone) databases – provide quantitative
information on coverage based on an extensive library of news sources.4
Our results show a consistent pattern of responses by the two sets of firms to these
information shocks. Specifically, in each of our empirical exercises, we find that the stock
4This aspect of our study builds on recent contributions that have incorporated text-based information on
salient news shocks into stock market studies (e.g. Baker, Bloom and Davis 2016, Loughran and McDonald
2011, Tetlock 2007).
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returns of firms owned by targeted political groups (our target portfolio) and companies
unrelated to these groups (our non-target portfolio) both react positively to information
indicating progress in diplomatic negotiations. However, the effects are significantly larger
for the target portfolio. This pattern is compatible with a scenario in which sanctions rely
on ‘blunt instruments’ and so affect the economy of the receiving country more widely than
intended. But it also suggests that the TSE-listed assets of Iran’s political elite were indeed
affected by sanctions, and differentially so when compared with other listed firms.
We calculate total effect magnitudes across the full sample period using a specification
focused on the top decile of sanctions news shocks. This indicates that around 17% to 25% of
average daily returns of target firms, and 5% to 10% for the non-target group, can be assigned
to major news shocks related to sanctions negotiations. We can therefore credit a non-trivial
fraction of the positive returns that accrued to the target portfolio in the 2012-2015 period
to news about the potential lifting of sanctions.
We also show that a later negative shock in expectations of the sanctions deal’s contin-
uation, provided by Donald Trump’s surprise election victory, is similarly associated with
differential stock returns (negative in this case) for target firms. Subsequent developments,
again captured using daily news coverage measures, show no additional sensitivity for target
portfolio returns, possibly implying that sanctions policies went ‘off target’ after Trump took
power. However, the events captured by our coverage measures during the period after the
US election (such as new sanctions in response to Iranian missile tests) are quite different
from the diplomatic negotiations underlying our main results.
Finally, we show evidence that our main results are not driven by a potential alternative
explanation: that diplomatic progress also changes the likelihood of conflict between Iran
and other countries, which could itself have heterogeneous effects on target and non-target
firms. We first observe that while both portfolios are sensitive to a political betting market
measure of Iran’s probability of direct military conflict with the US or Israel, the target
portfolio is not differentially responsive to this information. We then find that the returns
of arms industry firms listed on stock markets outside Iran show no significant co-movement
with news of diplomatic progress towards a deal on Iran sanctions.
Overall, our finding of systematic comovement between target firm returns and events
relating to sanctions removal provides evidence that multilateral sanctions against Iran suc-
ceeded in inducing some degree of ‘income targeting’ of the political elite. Even though we
cannot say whether decisionmakers were explicitly driven by this incentive when negotiating
the removal of sanctions, our empirical evidence suggests that such an incentive existed.
4
Related Literature. Our study makes a novel contribution to the substantial literature
on the economics of sanctions. A large body of empirical work has studied the question of
whether, and under what circumstances, sanctions accomplish the stated goals of the sender.
Much of this work builds on the cross-country analysis and dataset of Hufbauer, Schott and
Elliott (1990) and focuses on whether the offending policies of sanctioned countries are
actually altered after sanctions are imposed. Very few papers zoom in to consider whether
the incidence of sanctions within a given country is in line with the intentions of the sender.
Recent firm-level research by Ahn and Ludema (2017, 2019) finds that US and EU ‘smart
sanctions’ on specific Russian companies, and their shareholders, managers and directors,
have had substantial negative effects on those firms’ performance. The key distinction be-
tween our studies is that Ahn and Ludema evaluate the efficacy of a set of specific sanctions
instruments aimed at particular entities, while we assess the success of targeting in terms of
the impact of the sanctions regime as a whole on the assets of influential political actors.5
Moreover, unlike the rest of the sanctions literature, our estimates are not based on the
timing of the imposition of sanctions, but instead exploit news about progress towards their
removal. It is this innovation that allows us to estimate the impact of the full suite of Iran
sanctions rather than individual measures, because news about diplomatic progress relates
to the lifting of the entire sanctions regime. It also means that we can use unexpected and
precisely timed progress in diplomatic negotiations for identification.
Within the wider political economy literature, our paper is one of a number of recent
studies exploiting variation in stock market returns within an event study framework. This
methodology has been applied to topics such as the private benefits of civil conflict (Guidolin
and La Ferrara 2007), the economic implications of covert foreign intervention (Dube, Kaplan
and Naidu 2011) and the value of political connections (Fisman 2001, Faccio 2006, Coulomb
and Sangnier 2014, Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun 2018). We also contribute to a growing
literature on the political economy of the Middle East (e.g. Jaeger and Paserman 2008,
Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011, Durante and Zhuravskaya 2018).
Structure. The paper is organized in the typical way. Section 2 presents a conceptual
framework to motivate our study and its research design. Section 3 provides background
5Some studies have considered the impact of sanctions on political outcomes (rather than regime assets):
Marinov (2005) finds that leaders of countries subject to economic sanctions are more likely to lose power,
while Allen (2008) notes a positive relationship between sanctions and antigovernment activity. Another
paper considering the economic impact of sanctions on subgroups within a country is that of Neuenkirch and
Neumeier (2016), who argue that US sanctions have led to an increase in poverty in sanctioned countries.
Haidar (2017) finds heterogeneous effects of sanctions on Iran on exporting firms depending on characteristics
such as exporter size.
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information on the history of sanctions on Iran and the political entities targeted by these
sanctions. Section 4 describes the data we use, and Section 5 then presents our empirical
analysis. Section 6 assesses the possible alternative interpretation of our results in terms of
changes in the risk of conflict. Section 7 offers concluding remarks.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we first set out a simple static framework to clarify why countries might want
to target sanctions, and why the effectiveness of targeting is an important economic question.
As part of this, we frame the effects of sanctions as creating an incentive (‘carrot’) for policy
changes in a sanctions-receiving country, distinguishing between targeted and non-targeted
sub-groups within the receiver. We then discuss the effect of ‘blunt instruments’ on the
realized incidence of sanctions and show that the cost of sanctions tends to increase under
this scenario, due to the wider distribution of impacts across these sub-groups. Finally, we
consider the implications of time-varying progress in negotiations towards sanctions relief,
in order to motivate our empirical strategy and aid in the interpretation of our results.
In particular, the spread of impacts suggested by our framework lets us tie our sanctions
bluntness parameter β to the results of a difference-in-difference model that compares the
asset values of targeted and non-targeted groups within the receiver over time.
2.1 Setup
We consider a scenario in which sanctions are imposed in order to induce changes in a
particular policy in the sanctioned country, since this was the usual publicly stated goal
of multilateral sanctions on Iran.6 Consider two countries, a sender S of sanctions and a
receiver R. Within R, a group p (the ‘political elite’) has control over a policy that, if in
place, benefits p but imposes a cost on S. In response, S imposes economic sanctions on R,
offering to lift these sanctions if R ends the policy. While sanctions may also be costly to the
sender S (because of lost trade, transactions costs, or political considerations), we assume
for simplicity that these costs are lower than the cost to S of the offending policy in place
in receiver R.
Once sanctions are imposed, they work as a carrot rather than a stick: as long as the
6The framework in this section can easily be extended to accommodate other scenarios; for example, to
show that the targeting of sanctions may also be desirable if the sanctioners’ goal is to alter the balance of
power between different actors within the sanctioned country, as in Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988).
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group p within R benefits from sanctions relief, the removal of sanctions is effectively a
reward for ending the policy that harms S.7 Say that the income cost of sanctions in R is y,
and that this cost is spread additively across group p and the group o (‘others’), constituting
the rest of the population of R, so that yp + yo = y. Also assume that group p has a welfare
function consisting of three additive terms: bp, the benefit to p from the policy being in
place; Y R = Yp + Yo, the aggregate income of R; and an additional weight α− 1 on Yp, the
income of group p. Then welfare of p is equal to bp + αYp + Yo. The relevance of Yo to the
welfare of p might be due to altruism or ‘good governance’ by group p, or because of the
need for support from the population as a whole in order to sustain the political regime.
But as long as α > 1, group p values increases in its own income more highly than similar
increases in the income of the rest of the population.
To understand the potential attractiveness of targeting to S, assume that the cost of
sanctions to S rises in y, so that increasing the cost of sanctions in the receiving country
also increases the cost to the sender.8 Then consider the scenario in which S has complete
control over their incidence across o and p. In this case, S solves the problem:
min
yp,yo
yp + yo subject to αyp + yo ≥ bp, yp ≥ 0, yo ≥ 0
The sender must assure that the benefit to group p if the sanctions are lifted is at least as
large as the cost of ending the policy, while minimizing the cost of sanctions to S itself.
Given that α > 1, the solution to this problem is to set yp =
1
α
bp, yo = 0. In other words,
as long as each additional unit of income lost by p has a greater effect on the welfare of p
than a unit of income lost by others in R, the minimum-cost sanctions policy is to target
sanctions so that they affect the income of p exclusively.9
2.2 ‘Blunt Instruments’
Now imagine that S cannot control the incidence of sanctions within R, perhaps because of
the bluntness of the available sanctions instruments, or the asymmetric capacity for sanctions
7Note that because of the empirical context we study (in which sanctions are in place and the sender
and receiver are already negotiating sanctions relief), we abstract from the stage in which sanctions are
threatened but not yet imposed; see Eaton and Engers (1992) for a model that incorporates this stage.
8A sanctions regime of higher intensity might, for example, lead to greater foregone gains from trade or
increased transactions costs for the sender.
9Note that in this static framework, we implicitly assume that the costs imposed by the sanctions to
the receiver at the point of introduction are symmetric with the benefits of removing the sanctions. This
necessarily abstracts from more complex scenarios where the incidence of costs that arise when sanctions
first hit is different from the incidence of benefits when sanctions are lifted.
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avoidance across groups within R. In particular, say that an attempt at a ‘fully targeted’
regime of cost y actually leads to incidence yp = βy, yo = (1− β)y for some β ∈ [0, 1] that is
exogenous to S. The β parameter can therefore be seen as the share of income costs borne
by the political elite group p within the receiver country. In simple terms, β = 0 corresponds
to the elite group p escaping all of the income costs of sanctions, while β = 1 implies that
the full income costs fall on the political elite only.
In the ‘bluntness’ case where β < 1, the chosen sanctions regime will be costlier than in
the scenario where S can control sanctions incidence. In particular, the solution for S is now
to set y = 1
αβ+(1−β)bp, which is a greater total cost than under the targeted regime, where
y = 1
α
bp. In this model, both S and R (in aggregate) therefore benefit from the ability of S
to target sanctions. The effectiveness of targeting – here quantified as the magnitude of β –
is thus an interesting economic question.
2.3 Negotiations for Sanctions Removal
Once a given sanctions regime is imposed, the above static framework requires that a cost-
benefit analysis by group p should lead to an immediate decision to remove or continue
the policy. In practice, however, a sender and receiver of sanctions can engage in a period
of negotiations over the actual concessions to be made by the receiver, and the sender
might escalate or ease the sanctions regime during this period. Based on the progress of
negotiations, the expected discounted costs of sanctions and benefits from the offending
policy may therefore evolve over time, due to changes to the current situation as well as
expected future events. For example, if S and R take a step towards a deal to exchange
policy reform for sanctions relief, this will lead to a decrease in the expected (discounted)
future costs of sanctions to both p and o and the expected future benefit of the policy to p.
Therefore, if we are interested in learning about β using information from progress in
political negotiations, we need an empirical strategy that separates the effects of these ne-
gotiations on the costs of sanctions to the targeted political elite p and to the non-elite o. In
this study, we use stock returns data to examine the evolution of the asset values of groups
corresponding to p and o during negotiations between Iran and its sanctioners.
If the values of assets of p comove positively with news of progress in negotiations, and
these asset values are unrelated to any benefits from the policy itself, then we interpret this
comovement as evidence that β 6= 0. Practically, this implies that the group p benefits
from expected sanctions relief because it has not escaped bearing an income cost from the
sanctions. If the values of assets of the non-elite group o move together with these shocks,
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we similarly consider this to be evidence that β 6= 1; that is, the elite group does not bear
the full costs and there is some sharing of costs between p and o. Finally, we derive further
information about β by comparing the relative magnitudes of these changes in the values of
the two groups’ assets. As we outline in Section 5, this maps into our empirical difference-in-
difference model so that we are able to provide a broad empirical assessment of the success
of sanctions policy in terms of the targeting bluntness parameter β.
3 Background
3.1 Sanctions on Iran and Political Negotiations
While the United States has maintained economic sanctions on Iran since soon after its 1979
revolution, robust multilateral sanctions prompted by Iran’s nuclear program were imposed
only from the mid-2000s.10 The United Nations Security Council first passed a resolution
threatening Iran with sanctions in July 2006, in reference to International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) reports stating that the IAEA was unable to determine that Iran’s nuclear
program had no military dimension. The resolution called for Iran to suspend enrichment
and reprocessing activities associated with its nuclear program. Sanctions were then imposed
in December 2006 and tightened in two subsequent resolutions in 2007 and 2008, with these
resolutions specifying that the sanctions would be removed once Iran met requirements set
by the IAEA and the Security Council itself.
The sanctions put in place during this period constituted both narrowly focused ‘smart
sanctions’ and more comprehensive measures. For instance, the Security Council resolutions
asked states to freeze the assets of specific firms, individuals and other organizations directly
involved in Iran’s nuclear program, and also to “exercise vigilance” over the foreign activities
of Iranian financial institutions in general. Sanctions were publicly portrayed as targeting
the economic interests of actors with political influence inside Iran, by cutting Iran off on
margins that would specifically affect those interests.11 However, some observers argued that
sanctions were ineffective, or even strengthened defenders of the nuclear program within Iran:
10US sanctions on Iran have included a variety of measures relating not only to weapons proliferation, but
also to terrorism and human rights.
11For example, after the US ended access to the American financial system for a major Iranian bank, the
US Treasury’s Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence argued that “[w]hile those who are
currently benefitting from Iranian integration into the global economy are the ones who will feel this isolation
the most, they are also in the best position to persuade the regime that its current track will undermine the
future of the Iranian people.” (Wall Street Journal 2006)
9
for example, the Wall Street Journal suggested in 2006 that US pressure on Iranian banks
“ended up boosting the very hard-line forces there that the US wants to curb.”12
Several rounds of international negotiations were held alongside this gradual tightening
of sanctions in the wake of the initial 2006 Security Council resolution. The talks with Iran
were led by the ‘P5+1’ group of countries: the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) as well as Germany. This process failed
to reach agreement on sanctions relief in exchange for policy changes in Iran.
From 2010 through early 2012, the sanctions regime was greatly intensified, both due
to a new UN Security Council resolution in mid-2010 and through various additional mea-
sures taken by individual actors including the US and EU. These new sanctions imposed
severe limitations on Iran’s international financial access; for example, the Belgium-based
organization in charge of international banking transactions (SWIFT) removed a number of
Iranian banks from its system in early 2012, after pressure from the EU. At the same time,
new restrictions were placed on imports of various goods from Iran, including oil, by the
EU and others. Meanwhile, the pace of diplomatic negotiations slowed; the only round of
high-level multilateral talks during this period, in late 2010 and early 2011, did not produce
a breakthrough.
After a hiatus of more than a year, the P5+1 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program
resumed with a meeting in Istanbul in April 2012, and were characterized as successful by
both sides (BBC 2012). After a series of meetings over the following months, the first major
diplomatic breakthrough occurred in Geneva in November 2013, when the parties agreed to
a framework agreement. This deal was followed by lengthy negotiations on a final agreement
to lift sanctions in exchange for concessions related to Iran’s nuclear program. The interim
agreement reached at Geneva, which was originally due to expire in July 2014, was extended
twice, with an eventual final deadline of June 2015. The framework of a final agreement
was reached during high-level negotiations in Lausanne in April 2015, and the details of this
deal were eventually concluded on July 14, 2015. Finally, after the agreement was officially
approved by all parties and the IAEA reported that Iran had met its commitments under
the deal, multilateral sanctions were lifted in January 2016.
However, the situation changed when in November 2016, an opponent of the agreement,
Donald Trump, won the US presidential election. While the other members of the P5+1
group maintained their support for the accord, the US withdrew from the deal and began
12The article suggests that financial sanctions negatively affected firms unconnected to the regime, cre-
ating opportunities for hard-liners to purchase such companies; this could be interpreted as an especially
problematic case of the ‘blunt instruments’ issue we have outlined.
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reimposing sanctions in May 2018. US nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were fully restored
in November 2018. These new US sanctions were not accompanied by high-level political
negotiations with Iran over conditions for their removal.
3.2 Targeted Political Entities
Throughout the development of multilateral sanctions on Iran, the UN, EU and US have
publicly linked sanctions policies to specific entities who have a major political influence over
the direction of Iran’s nuclear strategy, but also hold substantial economic assets. We discuss
the nature of each of these actors’ influence over the nuclear program and the structure of
their economic interests in turn.
3.2.1 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The IRGC is a military organization with the explicit political role of guarding the 1979
Islamic revolution and promoting it outside Iran. The IRGC therefore officially functions
as a branch of Iran’s armed forces alongside its regular military, but is also known to be
influential in politics, and former IRGC members such as Mahmoud Ahmedinejad (president
of Iran between 2005 and 2013) frequently serve in prominent political roles.
The US, EU and the UN Security Council have all claimed the existence of close links
between the IRGC and Iran’s nuclear program in official documents. For example, in the
2010 resolution mentioned earlier, the UN Security Council noted “with serious concern the
role of elements of the [IRGC] ... in Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems” (UN 2010). In a document from the same
year, the EU characterized the IRGC as “responsible for Iran’s nuclear program” (EU 2010).
As noted above, the multilateral sanctions regime included instruments intended to in-
fluence political actors through comprehensive restrictions (e.g. on financial transactions),
as well as smart sanctions incident on specific entities. The IRGC’s extensive economic
presence in Iran – originating from its participation in military industries and provision of
services for current personnel and veterans, but now covering a wide range of industries –
makes it potentially vulnerable to sanctions of both types. Indeed, beginning with the first
UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions in 2006, individuals and firms associated
with the IRGC have been the subject of a large number of smart sanctions. For instance,
the Fordow fuel enrichment plant became a focus of nuclear diplomacy after its disclosure
in September 2009, and the UN Security Council’s 2010 resolution on Iran included the im-
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position of smart sanctions on a group of IRGC-owned firms that had been involved in its
construction.
3.2.2 Supreme Leader and Setad
While Iran’s political system includes an elected president as well as a parliament, it is the
Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who is effectively its most powerful figure. This includes
ultimate political control of its nuclear program, as recognized by Wendy Sherman, the lead
negotiator for the US in the Iran talks, in a Congressional hearing in December 2013: “The
Supreme Leader is the only one who really holds the nuclear file, [and] makes the final
decisions about whether Iran will reach a comprehensive agreement to forgo much of what
it has created in return for the economic relief it seeks” (Kerr 2018).
As with the IRGC, the Supreme Leader’s economic interests have been recognized and
targeted by the senders of sanctions on Iran. The EU imposed sanctions on Mohammad
Mokhber in 2010, characterizing him as “President of the Setad Ejraie Foundation, an in-
vestment fund linked to Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader” (EU 2010). In June 2013,
the United States Treasury announced sanctions on “a major network of front companies
controlled by Iran’s leadership” (US Treasury 2013). The Treasury identified 37 firms in
a network associated with the organization EIKO (the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Or-
der), also known as Setad, which it claimed were “generating billions of dollars in profits for
the Iranian regime each year”. While the US Treasury did not provide further details on
Setad’s political ties, a Reuters investigative report on Setad later in 2013 identified it as
a conglomerate controlled by Supreme Leader Khamenei, and noted that Setad’s revenues
allowed for Khamenei’s financial independence from Iran’s parliament and national budget
process (Reuters 2013).
A report in 2015 revealed that the targeting of the Supreme Leader’s economic base
in Setad was an explicit political strategy on the part of sanctioners. Officials quoted by
Reuters (2015) indicated that the organization was hit with smart sanctions in 2013 because
the US “saw it as close to Khamenei and believed that the sanctions might induce him
back to serious nuclear negotiations”. Another official also noted that at that time, nuclear
talks were deadlocked and action was felt to be needed: “The reason why we dropped the
hammer on them when we did is because we were attempting to put pressure on the Supreme
Leader (to agree to a deal)” (Reuters 2015). This report also suggested that the lifting of
sanctions yielded tangible economic benefits for the conglomerate, such as the facilitation of
international business deals. In Section 5.2, we take a closer look at the potential relevance
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to Setad of the 2013 US smart sanctions relative to other (more comprehensive) sanctions
instruments that were already in place.
4 Data
4.1 Stock Returns Data
We collect information on stock returns of listed Iranian firms by web scraping daily data
from the web site of the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). As background, it should be noted
that while the TSE is not as deep and sophisticated as many North American and Western
European stock exchanges, it provides a suitable setting for conducting an event study.
According to the World Bank’s Global Financial Development database (see C˘iha´k et al.
2012), the TSE puts Iran in the second (from top) quartile of financial access (share of
companies outside the top 10 in market capitalization), the third quartile of financial depth
(market capitalization as a share of GDP) and the second quartile of financial efficiency
(shares traded as a proportion of total market capitalization), relative to other countries.13
The TSE trades for three hours per day (9:00 to noon), five days per week (Saturday through
Wednesday).
Our main sample period covers the revived multilateral negotiations leading up to the
final deal. The sample therefore begins with the first day of negotiations in Istanbul (which
happened to fall on the first day of the TSE’s trading week) on Saturday, April 14, 2012, and
ends on Wednesday, July 15, 2015 (the last day of the TSE’s trading week), the day after a
final agreement was reached in Vienna. In brief, we choose this window because April 2012
represents the beginning of an uninterrupted phase of negotiations (that is, a period when
there was no major breakdown or hiatus in talks) and because the majority of sanctions were
in place by early 2012. As we outline in Section 5.2, this latter point facilitates an event
study research design centered on the effects of fully lifting sanctions.
As of the beginning of our sample period, there were 325 firms listed on the TSE. As
discussed in the next subsection, our sample is made up of two firm portfolios, which together
include 138 of these 325 firms. Daily returns for each firm are calculated by subtracting a
stock’s closing price for the previous day from its closing price for the current day and
13The TSE ranks very similarly to Egypt – the context studied by Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun (2018) –
by these measures, based on data from the Egyptian Exchange. A study of market efficiency (Jahan-Parvar
and Mohammadi 2013) indicates that the TSE is CAPM-efficient at the monthly level and displays patterns
of international integration comparable to Middle Eastern markets that are considered to be open, such as
Bahrain, Israel and Turkey.
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dividing by the closing price for the previous day. We multiply daily returns by 100 so that
they are expressed as percentages. We also exclude the top and bottom 1% of all observed
returns from our sample, so that our results are not driven by outliers due to measurement
error or very large positive or negative returns.14
For our exercises relating to the 2016 US election and subsequent events, we instead work
with a sample period beginning sixty trading days before the US election and ending on the
day when news of the US withdrawal from the deal reached the TSE. This period covers
August 13, 2016 to May 9, 2018. As with our main sample period, we drop the top and
bottom 1% of observed returns over this time.
4.2 Ownership Data
Our goal is to assemble a portfolio of firms listed on the TSE that were assets of the IRGC
and/or Setad during the sample period in order to gather evidence on whether the politi-
cal actors controlling these conglomerates may have gained from evolving progress towards
sanctions relief. We do so by using information on firms explicitly identified as IRGC and
Setad assets by the main ‘senders’ of sanctions (the US, UN and EU). We then identify the
TSE-listed assets of these members of the IRGC and Setad conglomerates.
We provide a graphical summary of our procedure for classifying firms in Figure A1. As
we discuss below, an important feature of our approach is that we identify not only the set
of assets on the TSE that are most closely linked to the key targeted conglomerates, but also
the TSE firms that are most removed from these conglomerates with no known affiliation via
ownership. This is highly valuable for our research design since this set of ‘most removed’
firms are likely those that the senders of sanctions were least interested in targeting. Hence
they provide the cleanest possible TSE-based comparison group for measuring the de facto
efficacy of targeting of the assets of the IRGC and Setad.
4.2.1 Target Portfolio
The initial ‘universe’ of firms that we consider are those that were listed on the TSE at the
start of our main sample period on April 14, 2012, representing a total of 325 firms. As a first
step, we exclude firms with business operations directly relating to Iran’s nuclear program,
as identified by the senders of sanctions, with prominent examples being Iran’s national
maritime carrier, IRISL Shipping Lines, and several large banks. These firms are dropped in
14Our main results are similar if the data is instead winsorized; results are available on request.
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order to avoid confounding the expected effects of sanctions relief with anticipated changes
in the business of supplying goods or services for the nuclear program.15
In the second step, we begin defining the target group of firms. This is challenging
because to do so, we require reliable information on the assets of the IRGC and Setad
conglomerates, which is not available on a systematic basis in documents such as annual
reports. However, as discussed in Section 3.2, Iran’s sanctioners have often imposed smart
sanctions on individual entities linked with the IRGC or Iran’s Supreme Leader. In each
case, the rationale for the imposition of sanctions has been laid out in an official document
produced by the sanctioner. We can therefore use these documents to identify entities that
the UN, EU or US have explicitly stated are owned or controlled by the IRGC or Setad.
Entities on which US smart sanctions were imposed due to their links with the IRGC
may be found using the Department of the Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons list (SDN list), in which these organizations are assigned a specific ‘IRGC’
identifier. We draft a list of all entities that have been tagged with this identifier and
subsequently cross-check these with US Treasury press releases that provide further details
on the reasons for their inclusion in the SDN list. We add entities into our target group
only if the relevant press release states that the entity is owned or controlled by the IRGC.16
On the other hand, entities sanctioned by the US due to their links with Setad do not have
a separate identifier on the SDN list. However, US smart sanctions on Setad assets were
imposed in a single episode in June 2013, and so we use a detailed US Treasury press release
from this episode to identify these firms.
Similarly, European Council decision 2010/413/CFSP and its amendments provide lists
of EU-sanctioned entities, while UN Security Council resolutions identify organizations des-
ignated for smart sanctions by the UN. Both sets of documents provide rationales for these
decisions. Again, we only include entities that these records state are owned or controlled
by the IRGC or Setad.17
15We define this set of firms using a similar approach to the one we use to identify IRGC and Setad assets,
discussed in the next paragraph. Specifically, we exclude any firm on which smart sanctions were imposed
by the US, EU and UN for involvement in supplying the nuclear program, according to official documents.
In terms of the conceptual framework, we do this so as to isolate changes in asset values that are unrelated
to any benefits from the policy itself; see Section 2.3.
16Sanctions have been imposed on some entities for providing support or services to the IRGC. For example,
Iran’s national air carrier, Iran Air, was sanctioned for the transportation of military-related equipment on
behalf of the IRGC.
17In 2010, the European Union also sanctioned Sina Bank, with the rationale that it was “very close to
the interests of the Daftar (Office of the Supreme Leader). It contributes in this way to funding the regime’s
strategic interests” (EU 2010). Because Sina Bank was not described as a Setad asset, we have not included
it in the target portfolio. However, the main results are robust to adding Sina Bank and its TSE-listed assets
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The third step in defining the target portfolio involves identifying all TSE-listed assets
of the IRGC and Setad entities defined in the process just outlined. Both the IRGC and
Setad conglomerates are comprised of a mixture of stock market listed and private, unlisted
companies. Thus, although information from the US, EU and UN allows us to identify 75
firms and other entities partly or fully owned by the IRGC and/or Setad, only six of these are
themselves listed on the TSE as of the beginning of the sample. To deepen our coverage of
IRGC and Setad assets, we therefore use shareholder information as of the beginning of the
sample period, extracted from the TSE website, to identify firms in which at least one of the
75 targeted entities is a shareholder.18 In this step, we identify an additional 44 TSE-listed
firms in which the IRGC and/or Setad have ownership stakes, resulting in a target portfolio
of 50 firms in total.
4.2.2 Non-Target Portfolio
We next construct a portfolio composed of the listed firms that we can most confidently
assume are not assets of either the IRGC or Setad. Our starting point is the 260 listed
firms that were not identified by the classification procedure documented in the previous
subsection. However, while this excludes the 50 firms with the most direct known ownership
connection to the IRGC or Setad, there are two additional groups of firms with more tenuous
or less certain connections to these two conglomerates, and we drop each of these from the
non-target portfolio.
The first group of companies that we drop are those with what could be termed ‘second-
degree’ connections to the IRGC or Setad. These are the 144 listed firms that are two or
more ownership layers below the 75 entities identified as IRGC or Setad assets by the US,
EU and UN. We then eliminate a second group of firms that sources other than the US, EU
or UN suggest might be assets of the IRGC or Setad.19 This eliminates another 28 firms
from the initial pool, leaving 88 firms in our non-target portfolio.20
as target firms.
18We are interested in all direct assets of these entities, and therefore do not use a cutoff for their observed
share of ownership. Our data on the size of IRGC and Setad ownership shares is anyway likely to be
very conservative due to our narrow definition of firms owned directly by these two conglomerates (i.e.
identification as such by the US, EU or UN). In Section 5.2.2, we investigate the heterogeneity of our main
results depending on observed IRGC or Setad ownership share.
19These sources are a 2013 Reuters investigative report on Setad (Reuters 2013) and a 2010 American
Enterprise Institute report on the IRGC’s involvement in the Iranian economy (Alfoneh 2010). We begin by
dropping listed firms that are identified in these sources but are not in our target portfolio. We then use
the TSE shareholder data again to construct layers of ownership below each of the entities named in these
additional sources, and remove all firms within this ownership structure from the non-target portfolio.
20When we estimate our main results with the 172 excluded firms inserted into the sample as a separate
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Table 1 shows summary statistics for firms in the target and non-target portfolios. Ac-
cording to data from the TSE, these two groups of firms make up a similar share of total
TSE market capitalization: between one fifth and one quarter in each case. The mean and
standard deviation of the daily return variable by firm-day are also very similar across the
two portfolios. Accounting data from Orbis for 2012, which is available for only a subset of
these firms, suggests that there are no statistically significant differences between the mean
turnover, assets and labour force of the firms in each portfolio. The industrial composition
of the two groups is somewhat different: for instance, a larger proportion of target firms
operate in the financial sector. We account for these differences in sectoral composition in
some of our empirical specifications below.
4.3 News Coverage and Event Data
As part of our research design, we construct daily measures of news coverage of sanctions-
related negotiations involving Iran. The main aim of these coverage variables is to provide
consistent measures of sanctions-related events that may be salient to TSE market actors
during this period of diplomatic progress towards a sanctions deal.
Factiva Measure. The first measure we construct is derived from the Factiva news archive
database, a business information tool marketed by Dow Jones and Company. Factiva covers
around 33,000 global media sources, including most leading newspapers as well as influential
multimedia content. We perform a full-text search on Factiva’s media archives and retrieve
all English-language articles which mention Iran and at least one of the P5+1 countries
alongside the word ‘sanctions’.21 The output retrieved from this query is used to create a
daily index of sanctions-related news calculated as the total raw article count, standardized
within the sample period.22 Because our goal is to measure TSE investors’ reactions to
the events covered in these articles, we assign all articles published over the TSE’s weekend
(Thursday and Friday) or during holidays to the subsequent trading day.23
portfolio, we find that their returns respond to sanctions-related events very similarly to firms in the non-
target portfolio. Our main results are thus similar if these firms are included in the non-target group.
21More specifically, the Boolean query we use is as follows: (Iran) and (US or USA or United States or
Russia or China or France or UK or United Kingdom or Germany) and (sanctions).
22For each of the two measures discussed in this section, we also create similar measures that are stan-
dardized within the alternative sample period used for the analysis of post-deal events in Section 5.3.
23Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) use a similar approach to construct a monthly measure of economic
policy uncertainty by calculating the frequency of articles containing a combination of three words related to
uncertainty, drawing on a sample of ten leading US newspapers. In an extensive audit study, they evaluate
the performance of this simple text retrieval algorithm by comparing its results with a human-coded index
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GDELT Measure. Our second event measure is derived from the Global Data on Events,
Location and Tone (GDELT) database. The GDELT initiative uses machine learning and
natural language processing (NLP) tools to create a high-frequency open-source database of
political events based on the text of news articles covering more than 37,000 online news
sources in multiple languages (including Persian). A key innovation of GDELT, compared
to other news databases, is that it provides information at the event level, where the events
are automatically defined via NLP algorithms.24
GDELT defines an event as an action undertaken by an actor upon another actor. Actors
can be national, subnational (e.g. rebel groups) or transnational (e.g. United Nations). Any
event recorded with exactly the same date, subject actor, object actor and event type is
treated as a single event and given the same unique event identifier in the GDELT database.
This allows a given event to be tracked over multiple articles and days. To measure how much
coverage a certain event receives, GDELT reports a count of all source articles mentioning
the event and attributes this to the calendar date on which the event first appeared in the
news. Each event is also classified into a four-digit category (e.g. ‘0341 - Express intent to
change policy’) based on another NLP procedure (Schrodt 2012).
For our analysis, we extract all political events stored in GDELT for which one of the
actors is Iran and the other actor is one of the P5+1 countries. We condition further on events
that lie in the two-digit categories that are most likely to contain diplomatic negotiation
episodes: ‘03 - Express intent to cooperate’, ‘04 - Consult’ and ‘05 - Engage in diplomatic
negotiations’.25 In line with our news coverage variable sourced from Factiva, we measure
events on an intensive margin using GDELT’s count of source articles that mention a certain
event, which can be interpreted as a proxy for the event’s importance. Again, we assign all
events occurring over the TSE’s weekend or during holidays to the following trading day.
After calculating the total number of relevant articles for each day, we standardize this
measure across all of the days in our sample. Before standardizing, we drop all events
in February to August 2013, during which time there was a steep drop in the number of
articles collected by GDELT, due to technical issues associated with a transition between
article collection systems.
and find the two indices to be highly correlated.
24See Manacorda and Tesei (2018) for a recent study that makes extensive use of GDELT data.
25For our 2016-2018 sample period, when many of the key sanctions-related events did not involve diplo-
matic negotiations, we also include the categories ‘10 - Demand’, ‘11 - Disapprove’, ‘12 - Reject’ and ‘13 -
Threaten’, along with ‘16 - Reduce relations’ (which includes the subcategory ‘Impose embargo, boycott or
sanctions’).
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Evolution of News Coverage. Figure 1 displays the variation in both of our event measures
over the course of the main sample period.26 The top six distinct events identified by each
measure, highlighted in the time-series plots in Figure 1, are all related to the sanctions
negotiations. Both measures spike at the times when the final framework agreement and final
official agreement were completed in Lausanne and Vienna respectively, when the Geneva
deal was reached and when US president Obama made a call to Iran’s president, Hassan
Rouhani. Our Factiva event measure also clearly identifies a round of negotiations in Vienna
that ended in agreement to extend the deadline for a final deal, as well as the release of an
International Atomic Energy Agency report in 2012. The GDELT measure instead places
more importance on early negotiations in Istanbul and Moscow. This suggests that these
measures vary similarly but not identically over time; indeed, the correlation coefficient
between the two is 0.72.27
4.4 Other Data
In order to test whether our results could be driven by an alternative war-related explanation
(since diplomatic negotiations may also have changed the likelihood of conflict between Iran
and other countries), we rely on two additional data sources. First, we extract price data for
betting contracts from Intrade, a large online betting market, in order to construct a measure
of the probability of military conflict between Iran and Israel or the United States.28 The
betting contract we use for this exercise is specified as “US and/or Israel execute an overt
airstrike against Iran by December 31, 2012”. The contract was to have paid $10 if an
airstrike occurred before December 31, 2012, and zero otherwise. During the trading period,
the contract traded in the range of 0 to 100, where 1 point equals $0.10. We use the contract
price to calculate the daily arrival probability of an airstrike that is implied by the contract,
under a set of simple assumptions about the conditions in this market.29 Figure A2 shows
26Variation in news coverage measures for our 2016-2018 sample period is discussed in Section 5.3.
27The top fifteen days by each measure may be found in Appendix Table A1; eight of these are shared
across the two measures.
28Intrade was an online futures exchange where predictions about events ranging from Oscar nominations
to presidential election outcomes were traded as futures contracts. Trading volumes on Intrade reached over
one million annually in 2012. Intrade was established in 1999, but in the context of a conflict with the US
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, suspended the accounts of its US members in December 2012 and
ended trading in early 2013.
29Specifically, let striket be the number of times an airstrike occurs between day t and December 31, 2012
(which we call day T ). On any given day t, investors can buy a contract at price pt that will be worth $10 if
striket > 0 and $0 if striket = 0. Assume that the process is Poisson, investors are risk-neutral and do not
discount the future, and the Poisson parameter λt prevailing at a given moment is known but can change
over time due to information shocks. Then we can back out λt from the closing price of the contract, since
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the evolution of the contract’s daily price and the implied daily arrival probability of an
airstrike from the beginning of the sample period (April 14, 2012) through the end of 2012.30
Second, we use the Datastream database to extract stock price data for a set of firms
for which profit expectations were likely to be sensitive to the odds of war in the Middle
East. In particular, we include all publicly traded firms in the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) 2012 Arms Industry Database. The SIPRI database identifies the
world’s hundred largest arms-producing and military services companies in 2012, but since
some of these firms are privately owned, we observe stock price data for 66 of the companies
on this list as of the beginning of our sample period.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Case Study: Geneva Deal
To more clearly introduce our event study strategy and interpretation of our results, we
begin by studying the effects of a single major event: the interim agreement negotiated in
Geneva in November 2013. We examine this event both because the Geneva deal was perhaps
the largest breakthrough in Iran’s negotiations with the P5+1 countries, and because the
timeline of this agreement (displayed in Figure 2) delivers some useful advantages for our
analysis. The final round of negotiations leading to the interim agreement began at 17:00
on Wednesday November 20, after the TSE closed at noon on the same day. The TSE was
then closed for two days as per the usual structure of the Iranian working week. During this
time, encouraging reports emerged about the progress of talks, which continued in Geneva
over both Thursday and Friday.31 When the TSE re-opened at 9:00 on Saturday November
23, there was thus a large amount of information on which the market could act. The final
agreement was then officially announced at 5:30 Tehran time on Sunday November 24, in
advance of the TSE opening again at 9:00 on the same day.
this price should be equal to $10 ∗ P (striket > 0), and P (striket > 0) = 1 − e−λt(T−t). Therefore, we can
calculate λt = (−1/(T − t)) ln(1 − (pt/10)). We multiply λt by 100 so that it represents a probability in
percentage terms.
30We do not display data from Intrade after December 22, 2012, since US trading on Intrade was suspended
as of December 23. Our regressions using this data similarly use a sample period before the suspension of
US trading.
31For example, as shown in Figure 2, an English-language live blog from Nasim Online news agency cited
several positive quotes from parties to the negotiations (“positive atmosphere”, “talking details”, “room for
optimism”), and reported agreement on the issue of nuclear enrichment, during the TSE’s weekend break
(Nasim Online 2013).
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The positive information shocks before each of these two trading days provide us with
an opportunity to use this progress in political negotiations to study the impact of sanctions
relief. Specifically, we formulate a difference-in-difference model based on our definitions
of the target and non-target portfolios and the timing of news from Geneva. Our baseline
model is structured as follows:
Rijt = αi + φGenevat + θTargeti ∗Genevat + uijt (1)
where i indexes firms, j represents industries and the time index t is at the day level. Here,
Rijt represents raw returns, Targeti is a indicator variable for firms identified as IRGC
and/or Setad assets, and Genevat is a dummy for the two days November 23 and 24, 2013.
32
We argue that the good news about progress towards a sanctions deal in Geneva should
imply higher future income for firms that benefit from sanctions relief, because the expected
future duration of sanctions falls. If investors hold this belief, then the stock prices of
these firms should be bid up upon the arrival of this news. Meanwhile, firms unaffected by
sanctions removal should not see abnormal returns associated with this event.
The estimated values of θ and φ are then informative about the targeting success of
sanctions across the listed firms we study. A scenario where φ = 0 but the target group in-
teraction coefficient θ > 0 would represent full success: elite assets would be affected without
any implied effects for the non-target assets. This would correspond to the ‘minimum-cost
sanctions policy’ in our conceptual framework with bluntness parameter β = 1, reflecting
complete targeting within our sample of firms.
The next scenario to consider is φ + θ = 0, which would imply that the targeted elite
assets in our sample escape all of the effects of sanctions, mapping to full bluntness β = 0
in our conceptual framework. The rejection of both of these hypotheses, however, would
provide evidence in favour of the third scenario, in which both the targeted elite group as
well as non-elite interests in the sample benefit from sanctions relief. This would imply that
the costs of sanctions were shared as a result of the ‘blunt instruments’ problem. The value
of θ, the additional effect of Geneva on firms that are assets of targeted political actors,
would then provide suggestive evidence of the magnitude of the bluntness parameter β.
Baseline Results. With these interpretations in mind, we present the results of estimating
equation (1) for a sample period that includes the two days November 23 and 24, 2013 and
32This model can be interpreted as a variant of the constant mean return model in the event study literature
(MacKinlay 1997) because of the inclusion of firm fixed effects. This is because we are effectively demeaning
returns on a firm-specific basis, analogous to an abnormal return.
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the sixty trading days beforehand. We use a sixty-day pre-period for our baseline estimates
because this is a standard estimation window used in the event study literature.33 As shown
in column (1) of Table 2, we find that for non-target firms, the Geneva deal was associated
with a daily return that was 0.648 percentage points above the mean return for those firms,
with an additional effect of 1.256 percentage points for target firms. Both of these estimates
are statistically significant when standard errors are clustered by firm.34
We next check whether the effects we estimate are concentrated in either of the two
trading days in which the market was hit by positive news about negotiations in Geneva.
Column (2) of Table 2 displays the results of regressions in which dummies and interactions
for November 23 (‘day 1’) and November 24 (‘day 2’) are included separately. The estimated
impact is similar across the two days for both the target and non-target groups. Because
November 23 and 24 are at the beginning of the trading week, when stock returns might
differ systematically from other days, we also rerun our baseline regression substituting firm-
day-of-week fixed effects for firm fixed effects, and find very similar results (see column (3)).
Another potential issue with our baseline specification is that firms in the target and
non-target groups are somewhat unevenly distributed across industries (see Table 1). Along
with the promise of potential changes in the future evolution of sanctions, the Geneva deal
also suspended some industry-specific sanctions (on crude oil, petrochemicals, the automotive
industry and precious metals). Our results might thus be capturing an asymmetric industry-
level effect of the Geneva deal itself rather than the impact of the multilateral sanctions
regime as a whole. However, in Table 2 column (4), we add industry-Geneva interactions to
our baseline specification in order to control for industry-specific effects of this event, and
find that our estimate of the differential impact of Geneva on firms in the target portfolio is
almost unchanged.
These results suggest that both target and non-target firms benefited from sanctions
relief, but that the impact on target firms was significantly larger. The estimated average
effect of each day of the Geneva event on non-target firms is approximately 32% of the size of
the standard deviation of returns across all firm-days in the sample. However, the estimated
abnormal returns for target firms are approximately 62% of a standard deviation higher than
this. This is evidence in favour of the possibility that targeting of sanctions was neither a
33Our results are robust to using other windows, including thirty-day or ninety-day periods.
34Using the much stricter strategy of clustering by the 15 industries in our sample, and using the wild
bootstrap approach of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) due to the small number of clusters, produces
p-values of 0.088 for our estimated difference-in-difference coefficient and 0.182 for the coefficient on the
Geneva dummy.
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complete success nor a complete failure, but that firms owned by targeted political entities
were more affected by sanctions than other listed firms.35
Placebo Analysis. The statistical significance of this difference between the returns of
target and non-target firms suggests that such a difference in returns between these groups
is an unusual occurrence. However, one common concern in stock market event studies
is the fact that daily returns do not tend to be normally distributed. Although we have
dropped large outliers, we might nonetheless question whether our p-values underestimate
the probability that we would observe such a large difference even if the interaction term
coefficient θ = 0.
To address this issue, we estimate a series of regressions, each with a dummy for a
different two-day period, an interaction of this two-day dummy with our target variable,
and firm fixed effects. The two-day dummies cover our entire sample period, from April
14-15, 2012 to July 14-15, 2015. We then plot the distribution of the estimated coefficient
on the interaction term from each of these 388 regressions in Figure 3, highlighting the ‘true’
Geneva result. It is apparent from this figure that our estimate of the differential effect of
the Geneva deal on target firms is in the far right tail of this empirical distribution. In other
words, over the time period around Geneva, it was highly unusual for the two-day returns
of target and non-target firms, conditional on firm fixed effects, to differ from one another
to the extent we observe in Table 2.
Daily Effects - Geneva Sample Period. Finally, we take a closer look at day-by-day
differences between the returns of target and non-target firms in the period around the
Geneva deal. To do this, we return to the sample period from our baseline regression, but
add the eight trading days after the end of our two-day Geneva event, so that we may
also observe information on the full two weeks after the Geneva shock. We then estimate
a series of regressions as described in the previous paragraph, this time instead using one-
day dummies for each day in the six TSE trading weeks from Saturday, October 26 to
35Note that the size of our point estimates is realistic as compared to estimates relating to other types
of major economy-wide policy shifts, such as the effect of changes of government. A useful benchmark here
is the study by Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitwewitz (2007). They provide a two to three percentage point
estimate of the impact of a Republican presidency on stock prices across historical elections. This includes
an 1.5 to two percentage point impact in the 2004 Bush-Kerry contest where they are able to leverage
sharp, well-measured shifts in the probability of Bush winning as part of their empirical strategy. While we
are not able to directly measure market expectations of the probability of near-term sanctions relief, it is
credible to think that this probability jumped sharply over the two-day Geneva window and that our total
1.9 percentage point effect for target firms (column (1) of Table 2) is a realistic movement in returns.
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Wednesday, December 4, 2013. We plot the estimated coefficients on the target * one-day
dummy interactions, along with their 95% confidence intervals, in Figure 4.
Throughout the two-week period starting November 23 (to the right of the vertical line in
Figure 4), the difference-in-difference coefficient for each day is positive, though not always
statistically significant. This implies that the differential effect of Geneva on target firms
was not eliminated by movement in the other direction soon after the deal was reached. At
the same time, there is a noticeable dip in the coefficients in the weeks preceding the deal,
including three days with statistically significant negative estimates. This might have been
due to a temporary surge of pessimism about the potential future incidence of sanctions
during the pre-deal negotiations.
However, it is also possible that our positive difference-in-difference estimate of the impact
of Geneva is instead driven by mean reversion for target firms after an unrelated negative
shock. This uncertainty about interpretation is a limitation of our analysis of a single event.
Our next empirical strategy is therefore to use a continuous measure of information shocks,
defined over a much longer time period, as outlined in the next section.
5.2 News Coverage Analysis
5.2.1 Basic News Coverage Model
For our main empirical exercise, we extend our sample period to the full range of dates dis-
cussed in Section 4.1: April 14, 2012 to July 15, 2015.36 Our period of study begins with the
April 2012 Istanbul meeting between Iran and the P5+1 for two main reasons. First, this
was the beginning of a diplomatic process with no long-term breakdowns, unlike the several-
month gap in talks that preceded Istanbul. Because relevant events occurred throughout
the sample, we have sufficient power to identify our parameters of interest using compar-
isons within shorter subperiods (quarters). Second, significant changes were made to the
multilateral sanctions regime over the several months before April 2012, but the majority of
sanctions were in place by the time of the Istanbul meeting. This facilitates an identification
strategy based on progress towards full sanctions relief instead of the imposition or removal
of particular instruments, allowing us to relate our estimated effects to the sanctions regime
as a whole rather than any single sanctions instrument. We end our sample period on July
15, 2015, the day after the final agreement was reached in Vienna.
36As discussed in Section 4.3, we exclude February to August 2013 for the GDELT news coverage measure
because of a technical issue with GDELT article collection during this period.
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To capture progress in diplomatic negotiations over the course of this period, we alter-
nately use the daily event measures sourced from the Factiva and GDELT datasets.37 In
both cases, our measure of progress is a standardized variable based on the number of news
articles about relevant events, as described in Section 4.3. We amend the model of equation
(1) by replacing our Geneva dummy with this continuous news coverage variable as follows:
Rijt = αi + φCoveraget + θTargeti ∗ Coveraget + uijt (2)
where again, i represents firms, j indexes industries and t indexes days, and the return and
target variables are as above.
Column (1) of Table 3 Panels A and B displays the results of estimating this specification
using the Factiva and GDELT measures, respectively. The Factiva estimates imply that
an increase in our news coverage measure by one standard deviation is associated with a
return that was 0.055 percentage points above the mean return for non-target firms, and an
additional 0.065 percentage points above the mean for target firms. Both of these estimates
are statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results using the GDELT measure are
similar in magnitude and statistical significance: in this case, when news coverage is higher
by one standard deviation, we see average abnormal returns of 0.069 percentage points in the
non-target portfolio and 0.064 percentage points in addition to this for the target portfolio.38
In the remaining columns of Table 3, we refine these initial results by relying on variation
within subperiods and/or industries. First, we note the possibility that our news coverage
measure tends to rise over the course of our three-year sample period for reasons other
than progress in negotiations (such as better measurement), which could bias our estimates
upward if average stock returns also increase. Therefore, in column (2) we use within-quarter
variation to arrive at our estimates. To do this, we substitute firm-quarter fixed effects for
the firm fixed effects in equation (2), where ‘quarter’ henceforth refers to a unique quarter
and year.39 This has a relatively small effect on the estimated coefficients and standard
errors.
37Of course, some of the events captured by these news coverage measures, such as the failed June 2012
negotiation round in Moscow, may represent setbacks rather than progress. However, because our sample
period began with much doubt about whether a deal could ever be reached, and ended with a deal actually
agreed, we argue that these measures capture forward progress on average.
38Clustering at the industry level using the wild bootstrap approach of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller
(2008) yields p-values of 0.002 for our estimate of φ for both the Factiva and GDELT measures, and 0.002
(using Factiva) and 0.012 (using GDELT) for our estimate of θ.
39Our sample ends on July 15, 2015 and thus includes only ten trading days from the third quarter of
2015. In our regressions, we include these ten days in the second quarter of 2015.
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We next consider the issue that both news coverage measures and stock returns may differ
systematically between different days of the week. Given that we have chosen to aggregate
measured news coverage over weekends and allocate this to the first day of the trading week
(as discussed in Section 4.3), this is a real concern. In column (3), we further refine our fixed
effects to the firm-quarter-day-of-week level, so that we are, for example, making comparisons
between the returns of each firm on Saturdays in the fourth quarter of 2012 with higher and
lower values of our coverage variable. This is our preferred specification, and we continue
to use firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects in all subsequent specifications. Our estimate
of the association between sanctions-related news coverage and non-target firms’ returns is
similar to before, but this new specification somewhat increases the estimated additional
returns of firms in the target portfolio, to 0.092 percentage points in the case of the Factiva
measure and 0.066 for the GDELT measure.
Finally, in column (4) of Table 3, we add interactions of our coverage measure with
industry dummies to the model of column (3). As in column (4) of Table 2, this provides us
with an indication of whether the additional effect on target firms is driven by the different
industrial composition of the firms in the target and non-target portfolios. However, as in
the previous section, we find that our estimates are not substantially affected by this change
to the specification.
5.2.2 Heterogeneity and Robustness
Analysis by Sub-Period. While our news coverage regressions expand our identification strat-
egy beyond the November 2013 Geneva agreement, they nonetheless still include this event.
It is thus possible that our findings in Table 3 are driven by the same diplomatic progress
in late 2013 that underpinned the results in Section 5.1. To check that our conclusions do
not depend only on the Geneva event, we rerun the regression of column (3) of Table 3 for
a period that excludes the entire sample frame used in Section 5.1 (the two Geneva event
days and the sixty previous trading days). The results, displayed in column (2) of Table
4, are highly reassuring: our estimated coefficients are unsurprisingly somewhat smaller in
magnitude (in comparison to the full-sample estimate in column (1), reproduced from Table
3 column (3)), but they remain positive and statistically significant.
As noted above, one key advantage of beginning our sample frame in April 2012 is
that the full sanctions regime was essentially in place in its final form by this time, after
significant changes over the two preceding years. However, a formal freeze on nuclear-
related sanctions by the UN, EU and US was not in place until November 2013, when it was
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agreed as part of the Geneva deal. The ‘cleanest’ test of the effects of diplomatic progress
towards comprehensive sanctions relief, in a period without the imposition of new sanctions
instruments, might therefore exclusively use post-Geneva variation in sanctions-related news.
In columns (3) to (5) of Table 4, we decompose the full-sample effect in column (1) into
separate estimates for three nonoverlapping periods: the Geneva deal sample frame used
in the previous subsection, and all trading days before and afterwards. The relationship
between each news measure and returns is again statistically significant for non-target firms
and significantly larger for target firms in the period between Geneva and the negotiation of
a final agreement (column (5)).40 Notably, though, the estimated coefficient on the target
interaction is not statistically significant for the pre-Geneva period (column (3)); we will
analyze this result more carefully below.
Additional Checks. Table 5 provides a number of additional robustness checks of our
main results in column (3) of Table 3 (which we reproduce in Table 5 column (1)).41 First,
in column (2) of Table 5, we assess the robustness of our estimates to a change in our
definition of the news coverage variables. Rather than using a continuous measure to proxy
for diplomatic progress, we return to an event study model in which ‘event days’ are assigned
a value of one and all other days receive a value of zero. Specifically, we define only the top
10% of observations as events, which corresponds (for both measures) approximately to a
dummy for days with a number of relevant news articles at least one standard deviation
above the mean. The estimates reported in column (2) show that returns of non-target
firms are 0.072 or 0.145 percentage points higher on these event days, and those of target
firms are an additional 0.153 or 0.196 percentage points larger, using GDELT and Factiva
respectively; all of these estimated coefficients are statistically significant.
We next consider the possibility that the effects of sanctions news are different for larger
firms, or for those firms with greater market capitalization. In Table 5 column (3), we control
for the interaction of the logarithm of market capitalization and our news coverage measure.
In column (4), we retain this new control variable, and also include controls interacting
40Recall that to construct the target and non-target portfolios, we use shareholder data from April 14,
2012, the first day of our sample period. To explore the implications of potential changes in ownership over
time, we re-estimate the regression in Table 4 column (5) using target and non-target portfolios that are
instead constructed via TSE shareholder data from November 20, 2013 (the final trading day before the
Geneva deal). Results using the Factiva measure remain of similar magnitude and statistical significance,
but in the case of the GDELT measure, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is smaller by half
and has a p-value of 0.19.
41Similar robustness checks of the findings relating to the Geneva deal in column (1) of Table 2 may be
found in Appendix Table A2.
27
coverage with log turnover, log assets and log employees; the sample in this case is restricted
to firms for which we have Orbis data in 2012. In both cases, our estimate of the coefficient
on the interaction term does not change substantially from our baseline regression.42
The final two columns of Table 5 deal with institutional features of TSE trading. In
column (5), we account for holidays other than two-day weekends, by adding fixed effects
for the number of days off immediately before the trading day, as well as interactions of
these with our target portfolio dummy variable. Meanwhile, in column (6), we deal with the
possible concern that our results are driven by thinly traded stocks, by dropping the bottom
25% of thinly traded firms from the sample. This is the quartile of firms with the smallest
number of days in which we observe any trading, over the course of the sample period. The
stocks remaining in the sample are all traded on at least 87.5% of sample days. Neither of
these robustness checks yields results that are substantially different from the baseline.
Potential Role of Smart Sanctions. Finally, we briefly explore the role of ‘smart sanctions’
instruments, as opposed to more comprehensive instruments such as restrictions on Iran’s
entire financial sector, in driving the targeting effects we observe.43 We first return to the
finding in Table 4 column (3) that target portfolio returns are not differentially sensitive
to sanctions news before the beginning of our Geneva sample period; i.e. before mid-2013.
This suggests the possibility that although most sanctions instruments were already in place
before this time, the imposition of smart sanctions on Setad assets by the US Treasury in
June 2013 (see Section 3.2.2) may have had an important effect. In Table A3, we look at
sensitivity to sanctions news measures separately by conglomerate, before and after mid-
2013. While returns of IRGC assets are more responsive to sanctions-related news than
returns of non-target firms throughout the sample period, analogous effects for Setad-owned
firms are apparent only after smart sanctions were imposed. This is suggestive evidence of
the efficacy of these particular sanctions instruments.44
Our second exercise compares the target firms that were directly subject to smart sanc-
tions with the other IRGC and Setad assets in the target portfolio. As reported in Table
42Note that the coefficient on news coverage is not of primary interest (since it now represents the asso-
ciation between news coverage and returns when all covariates equal zero), and so we do not display it in
columns (3) and (4).
43Note that even in the absence of smart sanctions, more comprehensive instruments could generate the
results we observe if their impacts on IRGC and Setad assets were stronger than their effects on other firms.
44An event study using the date of announcement of the Setad sanctions does not turn up significant related
short-run movements in returns (results available upon request). This might be because the sanctions were
anticipated by investors, but unfortunately, we are not aware of whether information about these sanctions
became available before they were officially announced.
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A4 columns (1) and (3), the estimated impact of progress towards a diplomatic agreement
is very similar for each of these subgroups.45 This result appears to indicate that smart
sanctions had no additional effect on directly affected target firms.
However, rather than providing evidence against smart sanctions’ effectiveness, the latter
finding might instead suggest that their impacts spill over to other related firms. Although
smart sanctions were imposed on only six of the target firms in our sample, each of the
44 other firms in the target portfolio had at least one owner that was itself subject to
smart sanctions.46 The study of sanctions on Russia by Ahn and Ludema (2017) notes the
phenomenon of ‘de-risking’, in which potential business partners shy away from transactions
with even an indirect connection to a firm subject to smart sanctions. To measure the
strength of this connection in our context, we further subdivide indirectly affected target
firms according to the ownership share of parents subject to IRGC or Setad-related smart
sanctions. We find that firms with above-median shares by this measure are significantly
more sensitive to sanctions news, though only when we use the Factiva coverage measure
(see Table A4 columns (2) and (4)). Overall, these exercises suggest that smart sanctions
might have been an important driver of our main results, but the evidence is not conclusive.
5.2.3 Magnitude of Effects
The ‘event day’ specification in the previous subsection provides a simple way of calculating
a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the magnitude of the effect of diplomatic negotiations
on firm returns. Specifically, say that diplomatic progress only occurred in days in the top
decile of the news measure, and that articles identified by the Factiva or GDELT measures
on all other days constitute irrelevant noise. Then we can simply multiply the estimates in
column (2) of Table 5 by 0.1 (the number of days in the top decile as a share of the total
number of trading days) in order to answer the question: what is the daily average return
over the sample period that can be assigned to progress in sanctions negotiations?
Applying this methodology to the Factiva measure, non-target firms are estimated to
have had a daily average return of 0.0145 due to progress in sanctions negotiations, which,
according to Table 1, is just over 10% of the actual average daily return of firms in this
portfolio over the period. The corresponding figure using GDELT is 0.0072, which is closer
to 5% of the observed average daily return. For target firms, using Factiva, the daily average
return due to diplomatic progress during the sample period is 0.034 (based on the sum of
45This conclusion is based on the full sample period, but also holds when we consider only the period after
the US imposed smart sanctions on Setad.
46This is because of how we identify target firms, as discussed in Section 4.2.1.
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our estimates of φ and θ), or approximately 25% of the average daily return of target firms
over the sample period. Using GDELT, this is instead 0.023, or 17% of the observed average
daily return of these firms. Based on this back-of-the-envelope method, we can thus credit a
non-trivial fraction of the positive returns of the target portfolio over this period to progress
in sanctions negotiations.
5.3 2016 US Election and Subsequent Events
We next examine the impact of the 2016 US election result on the abnormal returns of
target and non-target firms. When the TSE opened on November 9, 2016, it was apparent
that Donald Trump had very likely been elected US president, a surprising shift from the
probabilities prevailing at the time of the market’s closure on the previous day.47 Because
Trump had signaled his opposition to the Iran deal during the 2016 election campaign, while
Hillary Clinton was a supporter of the agreement, this event provides us with an opportunity
to study an exogenous shift in the probability of sanctions being reimposed by at least one
of the deal’s signatories.
As shown in column (1) of Table 6, the TSE’s response to this shock is a mirror image of
the estimated impact of the Geneva deal in column (1) of Table 2 (from which we reproduce
the same specification, including a sixty-day pre-period and firm fixed effects). Average
returns for non-target firms are 1.667 percentage points below their mean, while the abnormal
return for target firms is even more negative: an additional 1.296 percentage points below
average.48 Figure 5 presents daily event study evidence similar to that in Figure 4, with the
day of the election standing out as displaying significant negative effects for target group firms
relative to the non-target portfolio. This response to the US election surprise is consistent
with our earlier conclusions regarding the targeting of nuclear-related sanctions across listed
firms in Iran.
In a final exercise, we investigate the responses of target and non-target firms to subse-
quent sanctions-related events, using our Factiva and GDELT news coverage measures. We
study a sample period starting on the first trading day after the election event (November
12, 2016) and ending with the US withdrawal from the Iran deal (May 9, 2018). In columns
47See Silver (2016) for a discussion of expectations and predictions ahead of the 2016 US election. Silver’s
FiveThirtyEight model had the highest (29%) probability of Trump winning amongst a range of polling-based
predictions, typically in the 1% to 15% band. In addition, Silver notes that betting markets put Trump’s
odds at 18% on the eve of the election.
48Appendix Table A5 presents robustness checks of this result based on the specifications in Table A2 and
columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. Clustering by industry using the wild bootstrap yields p-values of 0.002 for
the coefficient on the election dummy and 0.032 for the interaction term.
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(2) and (3) of Table 6, we see that the estimated coefficient for non-target firms is positive; as
shown in column (4), this is driven by news involving the non-US signatories to the sanctions
agreement, who maintained support for the deal despite US opposition.49 However, there is
no longer a differential effect on target firms: the response of their stocks to these events is
not statistically different from that of the non-target portfolio.
In contrast to the previous result, this suggests that senders’ sanctions policy changes
drifted ‘off target’ at some point after the election. However, while intriguing, both of the
main results in this subsection should be treated with some caution. First, the post-2015
variation in our news coverage measures does not isolate shocks related to the multilateral
nuclear deal as cleanly as before. As seen in Table A7, which lists the top fifteen event days
for each measure during this period, we now also capture events such as Iranian missile tests
and a confrontation at sea between the US and Iran. We therefore cannot interpret the
findings in Table 6 columns (2) to (4) as relating to the expected incidence of sanctions as
confidently as in Section 5.2.50 At the same time, the election of Trump rather than Clinton
represents a choice between a whole suite of likely policies, and we cannot separate the effect
of a possible shift in US sanctions policy from impacts of other potential changes – though
we will consider one key factor, conflict risk, in the next section.
6 Alternative Interpretation: Conflict Risk
The analysis above rests on the assumption that the content of our event dummies and news
coverage measures consists of ‘clean’ information that is predominantly about sanctions. But
progress in diplomatic negotiations may have had other implications for the foreign policy
environment faced by Iran, specifically the probability of military conflict between Iran and
other countries. We perform two exercises to assess the potential implications of this issue
for the interpretation of our results, focusing alternatively on Iranian and non-Iranian firms.
49To define separate regressors for news involving the US and other countries in the P5+1 group, we use
the fact that in the GDELT data, each event is identified with only one country other than Iran.
50In Table A6, we study a more precisely defined set of events based on the requirement for the US
president to renew a waiver on most US sanctions every 120 days. This waiver, which was first signed by
Barack Obama for the implementation of the 2015 Iran deal, was renewed by Donald Trump in May and
September 2017 and January 2018, but not in May 2018, when Trump instead withdrew from the deal.
Unfortunately, news reports suggest that each of these decisions was expected in advance. Nonetheless, we
show the results of event studies based on Trump’s three renewals (columns (1) to (4)) and the US withdrawal
(column (5)). We observe impacts of both sets of events on non-target firms – positive when the waiver was
renewed and negative when it was not – but again see no differential impact on target firms.
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6.1 TSE Firm Returns and Conflict Risk
Our first exercise looks at the relative sensitivity of target and non-target firms to the risk of
direct conflict. In order to measure the probability of conflict, we use political betting market
prices for a contract regarding the likelihood that the US and/or Israel would “execute an
overt airstrike against Iran by December 31, 2012”, as discussed in Section 4.4. We then
estimate the relationship of the stock returns of firms in each portfolio with the change in
the daily arrival probability of an airstrike implied by these contract prices in Panel A of
Table 7. To do this, we use the same set of specifications as in Table 3, with the day-to-day
change in the probability of conflict replacing our news coverage measure, using data from
the first day of our sample period to the end of 2012.51
The results indicate that increases in conflict probability, inferred from rises in contract
prices, negatively affect stock returns for firms in our sample. In the specification with firm-
quarter-day-of-week fixed effects in column (3), we find that an increase in the daily arrival
probability of an airstrike that is higher by 0.1 percentage points (which is approximately
three times the standard deviation of this variable) is associated with a statistically significant
fall in returns of 0.158 percentage points. However, there is no differential sensitivity between
the two portfolios, since the estimated coefficient on the interaction of our target group
dummy with the change in arrival probability is statistically insignificant in all specifications.
In short, while conflict risk appears to have a negative effect on firm returns across the TSE,
there is no indication that the target group is more economically vulnerable to this risk.
6.2 Information Content of Sanctions-Related News Measures
In our second exercise, we examine the possibility that our news coverage measures contain
confounding information about the probability of direct military conflict. The ideal sample
for this exercise would be a group of firms that are ‘war-sensitive’ but not exposed to the
effects of sanctions relief. Our approach to approximating this ‘ideal set’ of firms is to
identify a group of companies on stock markets outside Iran who are sensitive to conflict
risk (benefiting from increased odds of conflict) but, as non-Iranian firms, are not directly
exposed to the local effects of sanctions.
As discussed in Section 4.4, we use a group of 66 firms from the 2012 SIPRI Arms
Industry Database, which identifies the world’s largest arms-producing and military services
51Ideally, we would also like to use information from similar contracts later in our sample period. However,
as noted earlier, Intrade suspended its US accounts in late December 2012, and all of its activities in early
2013.
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companies. We first confirm that this portfolio is sensitive to the odds of Iran-related conflict,
since these firms’ daily stock returns are strongly related to the change in the daily arrival
probability of an airstrike implied by Intrade contract prices.52 This allows us to use them
as a placebo group to investigate whether conflict risk and sanctions news are confounded.
In columns (1) and (3) of Table 7 Panel B, we regress the daily returns of arms industry
firms on each of our news coverage measures and firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects, as in
the specification in column (3) of Table 3, using data from the full 2012-2015 sample period.
The estimated coefficient on the coverage variable is statistically insignificant in each case.
We then refine our exercise to check whether firms that are more sensitive to the odds of
conflict between Iran and other countries respond differently to these news shocks. For each
of the firms in the sample, we run a regression of daily returns in the quarter before the
sample period (January to March 2012) on changes in airstrike arrival probability. We then
rank the firms according to the size of the estimated coefficient on airstrike arrival probability
(from most positive to most negative) and add the interaction between this variable and our
sanctions news measure to our regressions. This again yields statistically insignificant results.
In Table A8 Panel A, we repeat this exercise using a Geneva event dummy rather than
our news coverage measures, and similarly find no evidence that the returns of our sample
of arms industry firms were affected by this sanctions-related event. In the same table, we
show that the 2016 US election was followed by a surge in the stock market returns of these
firms. Gains in defense stocks after Trump’s victory were well-documented in media reports
at the time, which cited expected rises in military spending under Trump (e.g. Forbes 2016,
Washington Post 2016). However, we do not find evidence that this post-election bump was
linked to heightened risk of conflict with Iran in particular, as firms ranking more highly in
the sensitivity measure introduced above did not experience differential gains.53
7 Conclusion
In this study, we test a central plank of international sanctions policy: the efficacy of the
targeting of elite decision-makers within a sanctioned country. We consider the case of Iran,
52More specifically, we find that a specification with daily return as the dependent variable and the change
in the daily arrival probability of an airstrike implied by Intrade contract prices as the regressor, along with
firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects, yields an estimated coefficient of 2.768 and a standard error of 0.361.
53In contrast, the interaction of each of our 2016-2018 news coverage measures with this firm-specific
measure of sensitivity to Iran-related conflict does have a statistically significant estimated coefficient (see
Table A8 Panel B). This again suggests that the 2016-2018 versions of our Factiva and GDELT measures
may be capturing additional information other than sanctions news.
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examining the response of its stock market to information indicating progress in diplomatic
negotiations towards an agreement on sanctions removal. We find evidence that listed firms
owned by key groups within Iran’s political system were differentially sensitive to news about
potential sanctions relief leading up to the final deal. Importantly, this sensitivity suggests
that political elites within Iran faced a tangible economic incentive to negotiate the removal
of sanctions.
The change in US policy towards Iran after the 2016 election raises the question of
whether the response of Iranian firms to sanctions-related news has continued to follow a
pattern consistent with successful targeting. Our analysis indicates that while target firms
responded more sharply to Donald Trump’s election, such differential returns are not evident
for later events leading up to the 2018 US withdrawal from the Iran deal. However, news
about sanctions policy is more difficult to interpret from 2016 onwards relative to the 2012-
2015 period, when members of the P5+1 presented a unified front and news coverage was a
reasonable proxy for forward progress in negotiations.
It should also be noted that while our focus on listed firms has made our study possible
by allowing us to use high-frequency news shocks for identification, there are other important
dimensions of the Iranian economy that we do not measure here. First, our findings exclude
the costs from sanctions that were incurred by households. These are likely to have been
considerable: in 2012, when the intensity of the sanctions regime reached its peak, Iranian
GDP declined by 7.4%, while inflation exceeded 25% (World Bank 2019). Our results for
listed firms therefore need to be put into the context of other likely economic and social
costs. Second, we do not observe assets of the IRGC and Setad that are not listed on the
TSE. Our results do, however, provide evidence that sanctions were ‘on target’ in the sense
that sources of income for elite policymakers were positively affected by their removal. The
evidence we present here therefore indicates that a ‘complete policy failure’ scenario – where
Iran’s political elites fully escaped direct negative income effects from sanctions – can be
ruled out.
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Figure 1: Value of Daily News Coverage Measures, April 14, 2012 to July 15, 2015
This figure shows the evolution, over the sample period April 14, 2012 to July 15, 2015 (excluding February
to August 2013 for the GDELT measure), of a standardized count of the number of articles on relevant
events identified in the Factiva and GDELT datasets, as discussed in Section 4.3. The standardized Factiva






































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Distribution of Estimates Across Two-Day Periods (Geneva Deal Highlighted)
In this figure, we use data for the period from April 14-15, 2012 until July 14-15, 2015 to estimate a series of
models, each with a dummy for a different two-day interval, the interaction of this with our target portfolio
dummy, and firm fixed effects. Implementation of this procedure for the full set of consecutive two-day
intervals corresponds to 388 regressions, and the histogram reports the distribution of estimated coefficients
on the interaction term. The two-day Geneva event (November 23-24, 2013) is highlighted (the largest
estimated coefficient).
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Figure 4: Daily Estimated Target-Day Interaction Coefficients Around Geneva Deal
In this figure, we use data for the 60-day estimation window used in Table 2 and the subsequent two weeks
to estimate a series of models, each with a dummy for a different day, the interaction of this day dummy
with our target portfolio dummy, and firm fixed effects. The figure reports the estimated coefficient on the
interaction term and its 95% confidence interval for each trading day in the last four weeks of the 60-day
estimation window and the following two weeks. The vertical line is drawn immediately to the left of the
first day of the Geneva event (November 23, 2013). Standard errors are clustered by firm.
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Figure 5: Daily Estimated Target-Day Interaction Coefficients Around 2016 US Election
In this figure, we use data for a period including the 60-day estimation window used in Table 6 column (1)
and the subsequent two weeks to estimate a series of models, each with a dummy for a different day, the
interaction of this day dummy with our target portfolio dummy, and firm fixed effects. The figure reports
the estimated coefficient on the interaction term and its 95% confidence interval for each trading day in the
last four weeks of the 60-day estimation window and the following two weeks. The vertical line is drawn
immediately to the left of the US election event (November 9, 2016). Standard errors are clustered by firm.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – Sample Firms
Target firms Non-target firms
Number of firms 50 88
Daily return 0.134 0.136
(2.01) (2.05)
Market capitalization 12,357.47 7,908.29
(31,273.68) (22,461.24)
Share of TSE market capitalization 21.53 23.32
Share of firms by industry:
Mining 2.0 4.6
Food products 4.0 6.8
Wood/paper/textiles 2.0 3.4
Coke/refined petroleum 4.0 1.1
Chemicals 2.0 10.2
Pharmaceuticals 6.0 10.2
Rubber/plastic/mineral products 28.0 18.1
Basic metals 10.0 10.2
Metal products 2.0 1.1
Electronics/electrical equipment 4.0 8.0
Machinery 4.0 2.3
Motor vehicles 12.0 8.0
Transportation/telecom 2.0 1.1
Finance 16.0 8.0
Construction/real estate 2.0 6.8
Orbis data:







Daily stock return is in percent; its mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) are by firm-day, omitting
the top and bottom 1% of observed returns. Market capitalization, turnover and assets are in billion rial.
Market capitalization (from TSE data) is as of March 10, 2014. Total TSE market capitalization is calculated
for firms listed on the TSE as of April 14, 2012, omitting two firms for which data is unavailable. We use
a listing of firms by sector in TSE (2011) to classify firms into industries based on two-digit NACE codes
such that there are no industries in which only one of the two portfolios is represented. Data from Orbis on
turnover, assets and employees is from 2012, and is only available for a subset of firms. The number of firms
with available data on turnover and assets is listed in the table; employee data is missing for an additional
nine firms (four target firms and five non-target firms).
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Table 2: Baseline Results – Geneva Deal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Day-by-day Firm-day-of-week Industry







Target * Geneva 1.256*** 1.212*** 1.270***
(0.364) (0.383) (0.400)
Target * Day 1 1.414***
(0.417)
Target * Day 2 1.110**
(0.445)
Observations 6,587 6,587 6,587 6,587
Number of firms 129 129 129 129
This table displays estimated effects of the Geneva deal on returns of target and non-target firms. The
dependent variable is daily stock return in percent. ‘Geneva’ is defined as the two days Saturday November
23 and Sunday November 24, 2013. In column (2), ‘day 1’ is November 23, 2013 and ‘day 2’ is November 24,
2013. The sample period is Geneva and the previous sixty trading days. Columns (1), (2) and (4) include
firm fixed effects, and column (3) includes firm-day-of-week fixed effects. Column (4) includes industry *
Geneva interactions for fifteen industries. Standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Small
p-values are represented by *** (below 1%), ** (below 5%) or * (below 10%).
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Table 3: Baseline Results – News Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Firm-quarter Firm-quarter- Industry
FEs FEs day-of-week FEs interactions
Panel A - Factiva measure
Coverage 0.055*** 0.082*** 0.077***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Target * coverage 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.092*** 0.099***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 75,021 75,021 75,021 75,021
Number of firms 138 138 138 138
Panel B - GDELT measure
Coverage 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.065***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Target * coverage 0.064*** 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.075***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 62,129 62,129 62,129 62,129
Number of firms 138 138 138 138
This table displays estimated effects on returns of target and non-target firms from specifications that include
a daily measure of news coverage related to diplomatic progress between Iran and the P5+1 countries. The
dependent variable is daily stock return in percent. The variable ‘coverage’ is a standardized count of the
number of articles on a relevant event identified in the Factiva (Panel A) or GDELT (Panel B) data, as
discussed in Section 4.3. Column (1) includes firm fixed effects, column (2) includes firm-quarter fixed
effects and columns (3) and (4) include firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects. Column (4) includes industry
* coverage interactions for 15 industries. Here, ‘quarter’ refers to a unique quarter and year. The sample
period is from April 14, 2012 to July 15, 2015 (excluding February to August 2013 in Panel B). Standard
errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Small p-values are represented by *** (below 1%), ** (below
5%) or * (below 10%).
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Table 4: Heterogeneity – Varying Sample Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample No Geneva Pre-Geneva Geneva Post-Geneva
Panel A - Factiva measure
Coverage 0.077*** 0.070*** 0.129*** 0.261*** 0.062***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.035) (0.052) (0.013)
Target * coverage 0.092*** 0.055*** -0.019 0.302*** 0.067***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.052) (0.076) (0.021)
Observations 75,021 68,434 28,759 6,587 39,675
Number of firms 138 138 138 129 131
Panel B - GDELT measure
Coverage 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.042 0.150*** 0.064***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.039) (0.038) (0.013)
Target * coverage 0.066*** 0.045** 0.030 0.152*** 0.048**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.052) (0.051) (0.020)
Observations 62,129 55,947 16,272 6,182 39,675
Number of firms 138 138 138 129 131
This table displays estimated effects on returns of target and non-target firms from specifications that include
a daily measure of news coverage related to diplomatic progress between Iran and the P5+1 countries. The
dependent variable is daily stock return in percent. The variable ‘coverage’ is a standardized count of the
number of articles on a relevant event identified in the Factiva (Panel A) or GDELT (Panel B) data. In Panel
A, the sample period in column (1) is from April 14, 2012 to July 15, 2015, in column (2) it is from April
14, 2012 to July 15, 2015 excluding August 26, 2013 to November 24, 2013, in column (3) it is from April
14, 2012 to August 25, 2013, in column (4) it is from August 26, 2013 to November 24, 2013 and in column
(5) it is from November 25, 2013 to July 15, 2015. In Panel B, the sample period in all columns excludes
February to August 2013. All columns include firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects, where ‘quarter’ refers
to a unique quarter and year. Standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Small p-values are
represented by *** (below 1%), ** (below 5%) or * (below 10%).
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Table 5: Additional Robustness Checks – News Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Top 10% Market cap All size Days off Thin
dummy control controls controls trading
Panel A - Factiva measure
Coverage 0.077*** 0.145*** 0.051*** 0.092***
(0.013) (0.041) (0.016) (0.013)
Target * coverage 0.092*** 0.196*** 0.090*** 0.067** 0.110*** 0.082***
(0.019) (0.062) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019)
Observations 75,021 75,021 75,021 45,065 75,021 66,022
Number of firms 138 138 138 80 138 103
Panel B - GDELT measure
Coverage 0.065*** 0.072** 0.060*** 0.083***
(0.013) (0.033) (0.016) (0.013)
Target * coverage 0.066*** 0.153*** 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.045**
(0.017) (0.050) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018)
Observations 62,129 62,129 62,129 37,241 62,129 54,605
Number of firms 138 138 138 80 138 103
This table displays estimated effects on returns of target and non-target firms from specifications that include
a daily measure of news coverage related to diplomatic progress between Iran and the P5+1 countries. The
dependent variable is daily stock return in percent. In all columns, the variable ‘coverage’ is based on the
number of articles on a relevant event identified in the Factiva (Panel A) or GDELT (Panel B) data. This is
a dummy for the top 10% of observed values in column (2) and a standardized count in all other columns.
Column (3) includes interactions of log market capitalization as of March 10, 2014 with the coverage variable.
Column (4) includes interactions of log market capitalization as of March 10, 2014, and log turnover, log
assets and log employees from 2012 (if this data is available from Orbis), with the coverage variable. Column
(5) includes fixed effects for the number of TSE days off immediately before the trading day and interactions
of these fixed effects with the target dummy. Column (6) drops the bottom 25% of firms from the sample
according to the number of days in the sample period that their stocks were traded on the TSE. All columns
include firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects, where ‘quarter’ refers to a unique quarter and year. The
sample period is from April 14, 2012 to July 15, 2015 (excluding February to August 2013 in Panel B).
Standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Small p-values are represented by *** (below 1%),
** (below 5%) or * (below 10%).
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Table 6: Post-Deal Events – Potential Restoration of US Sanctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US election Factiva measure GDELT measure
Nov 2016 post-election post-election
Election -1.667***
(0.305)












Target * P4+1 coverage -0.035
(0.027)
Observations 6,346 36,557 36,557 36,557
Number of firms 120 123 123 123
This table displays estimated effects of the 2016 US election and subsequent sanctions-related events on
returns of target and non-target firms. ‘Election’ is defined as the event day Wednesday November 9, 2016.
‘Coverage’ is a standardized count of the number of articles on a relevant event identified in the Factiva
(column (2)) or GDELT (columns (3) and (4)) data. ‘US coverage’ is a standardized count of the number
of articles on a relevant event in the GDELT data in which the US is the country other than Iran identified
by the GDELT dataset, while ‘P4+1 coverage’ is an analogous measure for the other members of the P5+1
group. The dependent variable is daily stock return in percent. In column (1), the sample period is the
election event day and the previous sixty trading days. In columns (2), (3) and (4), the sample period is
from November 12, 2016 to May 9, 2018. Column (1) includes firm fixed effects and columns (2), (3) and (4)
include firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects, where ‘quarter’ refers to a unique quarter and year. Standard
errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Small p-values are represented by *** (below 1%), ** (below
5%) or * (below 10%).
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Table 7: Alternative Explanation – Conflict Risk
Panel A - Intrade airstrike arrival probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Firm-quarter Firm-quarter- Industry
FEs FEs day-of-week FEs interactions
Change in -1.405** -1.494** -1.580**
arrival probability (0.609) (0.602) (0.606)
Target * change in -0.819 -0.860 -0.783 -0.696
arrival probability (0.863) (0.845) (0.844) (0.938)
Observations 14,012 14,012 14,012 14,012
Number of firms 137 137 137 137
Panel B - Arms industry firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Factiva measure GDELT measure
Coverage -0.00005 -0.012 0.008 0.009
(0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014)
Sensitivity rank 0.0004 0.00003
* coverage (0.0004) (0.0004)
Observations 50,587 50,587 41,519 41,519
Number of firms 66 66 66 66
This table displays the results of regressions exploring the possibility that the main results are driven by
changes in conflict risk. Panel A displays correlations between returns of target and non-target firms and
the day-to-day change in the arrival probability of a US or Israeli airstrike against Iran, calculated from
the price of the Intrade contract “US and/or Israel to execute an overt airstrike against Iran by December
31, 2012”. Panel B displays estimated effects on returns of non-Iranian firms in the arms industry from
specifications that include a daily measure of news coverage related to diplomatic progress between Iran and
the P5+1 countries. The dependent variable in both panels is daily stock return in percent. ‘Change in
arrival probability’ represents the change in the arrival probability of a US or Israeli airstrike against Iran,
during the same day, in percent. ‘Coverage’ is a standardized count of the number of articles on a relevant
event identified in the Factiva (columns (1) and (2)) or GDELT (columns (3) and (4)) data. ‘Sensitivity
rank’ is the rank of each firm based on the responsiveness of its stock return to the change in the airstrike
arrival probability in the first quarter of 2012, as discussed in Section 6.2. In Panel A, column (1) includes
firm fixed effects, column (2) includes firm-quarter fixed effects, columns (3) and (4) include firm-quarter-
day-of-week fixed effects and column (4) adds industry * coverage interactions for fifteen industries. All
columns in Panel B include firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects. Here, ‘quarter’ refers to a unique quarter
and year. In Panel A, the sample period is from April 14, 2012 to December 22, 2012, and in Panel B, it is
from April 16, 2012 to July 15, 2015. Standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Small p-values



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A2: Daily Price of Intrade Contract and Implied Airstrike Arrival Probability, April
14, 2012 to December 22, 2012
This figure shows the evolution of Intrade contract prices (in current US dollars) for the betting contract
specified as “US and/or Israel execute an overt airstrike against Iran by December 31, 2012”, and the implied
daily arrival probability (in percent) of an airstrike, as discussed in Section 4.4. The contract was to have
paid $10 if an airstrike occurred before December 31, 2012, and zero otherwise. The period plotted is April
14, 2012 to December 22, 2012 (the day before US Intrade trading was suspended).
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Table A1: Top Fifteen Peaks in Sanctions News Coverage
Date Value Sanctions negotiations event
Panel A - Factiva measure
Apr 4 2015* 11.76 Framework agreement reached in Lausanne
Jul 14 2015 7.58 Final agreement reached in Vienna
Jul 15 2015 7.03 Final agreement reached on previous day in Vienna
Mar 25 2015* 5.60 Negotiation round ends in Lausanne
Jul 11 2015* 5.20 Negotiation round in progress in Vienna
Nov 25 2013 5.07 Interim agreement reached on previous day in Geneva
Apr 11 2015* 4.26 Framework agreement reached in previous week in Lausanne
Nov 9 2013* 3.74 Negotiation round ends in Geneva
Nov 23 2013* 3.40 Negotiation round in progress in Geneva
Sep 2 2012* 3.23 France calls for stronger sanctions after IAEA report
Sep 28 2013* 3.23 Presidents of Iran and US speak by phone
Nov 16 2013* 3.13 Negotiation round forthcoming in Geneva
Apr 18 2015* 3.13 Framework agreement reached two weeks earlier in Lausanne
Mar 25 2014* 3.09 Negotiation round ends in Vienna
Nov 26 2013 2.85 Interim agreement reached two days earlier in Geneva
Panel B - GDELT measure
Jul 14 2015 10.66 Final agreement reached in Vienna
Mar 25 2015* 9.07 Negotiation round ends in Lausanne
Apr 4 2015* 5.16 Framework agreement reached in Lausanne
Jun 19 2012* 4.97 Negotiation round ends in Moscow
Jul 11 2015* 4.67 Negotiation round in progress in Vienna
Nov 24 2013 4.55 Interim agreement reached in Geneva
Nov 9 2013* 4.22 Negotiation round ends in Geneva
Nov 23 2013* 3.55 Negotiation round in progress in Geneva
Nov 18 2013 3.33 Negotiation round about to begin in Geneva
Jul 15 2015 3.26 Final agreement reached on previous day in Vienna
Sep 28 2013* 3.23 Presidents of Iran and US speak by phone
Jul 4 2015* 3.21 Negotiation round in progress in Vienna
Mar 31 2015 3.17 Negotiation deadline extended in Lausanne
Mar 7 2015* 2.95 Several P5+1 members discuss negotiations
Mar 28 2015* 2.89 Negotiation round in progress in Lausanne
This table displays the top fifteen observations, within the sample period April 14, 2012 to July 15, 2015,
of a standardized count of the number of articles on relevant events identified in the Factiva (Panel A) and
GDELT (Panel B) datasets, as discussed in Section 4.3. For each of these observations, the table shows the
relevant date, the value of the variable, and an event of that day that is relevant to diplomatic negotiations
for sanctions relief. Entries that are among the top fifteen observations for both of the two measures are
highlighted in bold. Dates are marked with stars when the observation also includes events from prior days
because of weekends or holidays on the TSE.
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Table A2: Additional Robustness Checks – Geneva Deal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Market cap All size Days off Thin
control controls controls trading
Geneva 0.648** 0.630** 0.611*
(0.277) (0.274) (0.323)
Target * Geneva 1.256*** 1.260*** 1.948*** 1.226*** 1.467***
(0.364) (0.372) (0.468) (0.362) (0.422)
Observations 6,587 6,587 4,018 6,587 5,434
Number of firms 129 129 78 129 94
This table displays estimated effects of the Geneva deal on returns of target and non-target firms. The
dependent variable is daily stock return in percent. ‘Geneva’ is defined as the two days Saturday November
23 and Sunday November 24, 2013. Column (2) includes interactions of log market capitalization as of March
10, 2014 with the Geneva variable. Column (3) includes interactions of log market capitalization as of March
10, 2014, and log turnover, log assets and log employees from 2012 (if this data is available from Orbis), with
the Geneva variable. Column (4) includes fixed effects for the number of TSE days off immediately before
the trading day and interactions of these fixed effects with the target dummy. Column (5) drops the bottom
25% of firms from the sample according to the number of days in the sample period that their stocks were
traded on the TSE. The sample period is Geneva and the previous sixty trading days. All columns include
firm fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Small p-values are represented by
*** (below 1%), ** (below 5%) or * (below 10%).
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Table A3: Heterogeneity by Conglomerate – IRGC and Setad Assets
(1) (2) (3)
Full Before Setad After Setad
sample sanctions sanctions
Panel A - Factiva measure
Coverage 0.077*** 0.138*** 0.066***
(0.013) (0.038) (0.014)
IRGC * coverage 0.149*** 0.115 0.145**
(0.044) (0.071) (0.055)
Setad * coverage 0.085*** -0.075 0.106***
(0.019) (0.053) (0.021)
Observations 75,021 23,544 51,477
Number of firms 138 138 132
Panel B - GDELT measure
Coverage 0.065*** 0.042 0.067***
(0.013) (0.039) (0.013)
IRGC * coverage 0.077* 0.126* 0.072
(0.041) (0.072) (0.045)
Setad * coverage 0.065*** 0.015 0.070***
(0.018) (0.054) (0.019)
Observations 62,129 16,272 45,857
Number of firms 138 138 131
This table displays estimated effects on returns of target firms (divided into those that are IRGC assets and
those that are Setad assets) and non-target firms from specifications that include a daily measure of news
coverage related to diplomatic progress between Iran and the P5+1 countries. The dependent variable is
daily stock return in percent. The variable ‘coverage’ is a standardized count of the number of articles on
a relevant event identified in the Factiva (Panel A) or GDELT (Panel B) data. In Panel A, the sample
period in column (1) is from April 14, 2012 to July 15, 2015, in column (2) it is from April 14, 2012 to
June 3, 2013 and in column (3) it is from June 8, 2013 to July 15, 2015. In Panel B, the sample period in
all columns excludes February to August 2013. All columns include firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects,
where ‘quarter’ refers to a unique quarter and year. Standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses.
Small p-values are represented by *** (below 1%), ** (below 5%) or * (below 10%).
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Table A4: Heterogeneity – Firms Directly and Indirectly Subject to Smart Sanctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Factiva measure GDELT measure
Coverage 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.065*** 0.065***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Smart sanctions * coverage 0.102** 0.102** 0.071* 0.071*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Other * coverage 0.090*** 0.066***
(0.020) (0.018)
High share * coverage 0.118*** 0.071***
(0.026) (0.022)
Low share * coverage 0.064*** 0.060***
(0.021) (0.021)
Observations 75,021 75,021 62,129 62,129
Number of firms 138 138 138 138
This table displays estimated effects on returns of target and non-target firms from specifications that include
a daily measure of news coverage related to diplomatic progress between Iran and the P5+1 countries. The
dependent variable is daily stock return in percent. The variable ‘coverage’ is a standardized count of the
number of articles on a relevant event identified in the Factiva (columns (1) and (2)) or GDELT (columns
(3) and (4)) data. Columns (1) and (3) separate the target portfolio into two groups: firms ever subject
to smart sanctions and other target firms. Columns (2) and (4) additionally classify the latter set of firms
into two subgroups: those with above-median ownership by firms ever subject to IRGC or Setad-related
smart sanctions (‘high share’) and those with below-median ownership by firms ever subject to IRGC or
Setad-related smart sanctions (‘low share’). All columns include firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects, where
‘quarter’ refers to a unique quarter and year. The sample period is from April 14, 2012 to July 15, 2015
(excluding February to August 2013 in columns (3) and (4)). Standard errors, clustered by firm, are in

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A6: Post-Deal Events – Additional Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US waiver renewals US withdrawal
May 2017 Sept 2017 Jan 2018 All three May 2018
Renewal 1.590*** 0.330 0.486** 0.807***
(0.243) (0.256) (0.243) (0.163)
Target * renewal -0.187 -0.194 -0.156 -0.272
(0.388) (0.319) (0.284) (0.210)
Withdrawal -0.633**
(0.240)
Target * withdrawal 0.071
(0.335)
Observations 6,116 6,119 6,554 18,789 6,485
Number of firms 121 122 121 123 121
This table displays estimated effects of sanctions-related events after the 2016 US election on returns of
target and non-target firms. ‘Renewal’ represents an event day when US sanctions waivers were renewed:
May 20, 2017, September 16, 2017 and/or January 13, 2018. Each renewal event is studied separately in
columns (1) to (3), while column (4) jointly considers all three renewal events. ‘Withdrawal’ represents the
US withdrawal from the sanctions deal on May 9, 2018. The dependent variable is daily stock return in
percent. In columns (1), (2), (3) and (5), the sample period is the event day and the sixty preceding trading
days. In column (4), the sample period consists of the three renewal event days and the sixty trading days
prior to each of these event days. All columns include firm fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by firm,
are in parentheses. Small p-values are represented by *** (below 1%), ** (below 5%) or * (below 10%).
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Table A7: Top Fifteen Peaks in News Coverage Measures – 2016-2018 Sample Period
Date Value Event
Panel A - Factiva measure
May 9 2018 8.89 US withdraws from agreement on previous day
May 8 2018 6.68 US withdraws from agreement
Oct 14 2017* 4.83 US decertifies agreement
Feb 4 2017* 4.71 US imposes sanctions after missile test
May 5 2018* 4.04 US set to withdraw from agreement
Jul 29 2017* 3.97 US-Iran confrontation at sea
Apr 28 2018* 3.95 US Secretary of State calls for new sanctions
Jan 13 2018* 3.36 US renews sanctions waiver
Dec 3 2016* 2.87 US extends Iran Sanctions Act
Aug 6 2017* 2.68 Some P5+1 members attend Iran presidential inauguration
Mar 25 2018* 2.63 US imposes sanctions after hacking episode
Jan 6 2018* 2.34 Demonstrations take place across Iran
Sep 23 2017* 2.17 Iran tests missile, some P5+1 members support deal
May 7 2018 1.84 US set to withdraw from agreement
Jul 26 2017 1.63 Iran imposes sanctions on US firms
Panel B - GDELT measure
Oct 14 2017* 7.54 US decertifies agreement
May 9 2018 5.40 US withdraws from agreement on previous day
May 8 2018 4.97 US withdraws from agreement
Jan 30 2017 4.00 Iran tests missile on previous day
Jan 13 2018* 3.87 US renews sanctions waiver
Jul 29 2017* 3.67 US-Iran confrontation at sea
Feb 4 2017* 3.54 US imposes sanctions after missile test
Sep 23 2017* 3.17 Iran tests missile, some P5+1 members support deal
May 6 2017* 3.13 Agreement discussed at Iranian presidential debate
Jan 31 2017 2.80 Iran tests missile two days earlier
Dec 18 2016* 2.70 US confirms extension of Iran Sanctions Act
Jan 29 2017 2.52 Iran tests missile
May 5 2018* 2.40 US set to withdraw from agreement
Dec 20 2016 2.31 Iran meets Russia to discuss Syria
May 1 2018 2.23 Israel claims existence of Iran nuclear program
This table displays the top fifteen observations, within the sample period November 12, 2016 to May 9, 2018,
of a standardized count of the number of articles on relevant events identified in the Factiva (Panel A) and
GDELT (Panel B) datasets, as discussed in Section 5.3. For each of these observations, the table shows
the relevant date, the value of the variable, and an event of that day that is relevant to relations between
countries of the P5+1 and Iran. Entries that are among the top fifteen observations for both of the two
measures are highlighted in bold. Dates are marked with stars when the observation also includes events
from prior days because of weekends or holidays on the TSE.
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Table A8: Conflict Risk – Additional Specifications
Panel A - Geneva and election event studies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Geneva event Election event
Event -0.003 -0.067 1.221*** 1.646*
(0.138) (0.282) (0.421) (0.859)
Sensitivity rank 0.002 -0.012
* event (0.008) (0.023)
Observations 3,788 3,788 3,752 3,752
Number of firms 66 66 64 64
Panel B - Post-election news coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Factiva measure GDELT measure
Coverage 0.029*** 0.002 -0.024** -0.062***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.019)
Sensitivity rank 0.0008* 0.0011**
* coverage (0.0005) (0.0005)
Observations 22,516 22,516 22,516 22,516
Number of firms 64 64 64 64
This table displays estimated effects from specifications based on returns of non-Iranian firms in the arms
industry. The dependent variable in both panels is daily stock return in percent. ‘Event’ is defined as
Monday November 25, 2013 in columns (1) and (2) and Wednesday November 9, 2016 in columns (3) and
(4). ‘Coverage’ is a standardized count of the number of articles on a relevant event identified in the Factiva
(columns (1) and (2)) or GDELT (columns (3) and (4)) data. ‘Sensitivity rank’ is the rank of each firm
based on the responsiveness of its stock return to the daily change in the airstrike arrival probability in the
first quarter of 2012, as discussed in Section 6.2. All columns in Panel A include firm fixed effects, and all
columns in Panel B include firm-quarter-day-of-week fixed effects, where ‘quarter’ refers to a unique quarter
and year. In Panel A, the sample period is the event day (for the Geneva deal in columns (1) and (2) and for
the 2016 US election in columns (3) and (4)) and the sixty previous trading days, and in Panel B, the sample
period is from November 12, 2016 to May 9, 2018. Standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses.
Small p-values are represented by *** (below 1%), ** (below 5%) or * (below 10%).
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